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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent Great Recession soiled the credit reports of many
Americans. Furthermore, advances in database technology have
allowed employers and others wider access to comprehensive
information about consumers, sometimes significantly narrowing the
opportunities those consumers might have for employment, credit,
housing, or insurance. These results have inspired some state
legislatures to revise their credit reporting statutes to ameliorate the
percussive effects of the economic crisis on their citizens’ credit
records. However, state lawmakers must navigate the thicket of the
federal Fair Credit Reporting Act’s preemption provisions if they are
to create legislation that will be effective rather than impotent. This
Article analyzes these provisions alongside recent Supreme Court
decisions about preemption. The Article then provides both a theory
of the intersection of state and federal credit reporting laws and
describes the space remaining for state legislatures to create
preemption-proof, or at least preemption-resistant, credit reporting
provisions that can fairly balance the concerns of individuals and
those who want access to their background information.
Part II describes some recent legislative efforts in protecting
consumers’ financial and criminal record information. Following,
Part III sets forth the framework of federal preemption generally and
analyzes the Supreme Court’s recent preemption decisions that are
relevant to information-protection laws. Part IV describes the Fair
Credit Reporting Act provisions that may overlap with state
legislative activity, along with its specific preemption provisions, and
analyzes the vulnerability of various state credit reporting provisions
to preemption. The Article then maps out tactics for states to employ
to preemption-proof their legislation and maximize the effects of
their state information-protection laws.
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II. STATES’ REGULATION OF DISCLOSURE OF CONSUMER
FINANCIAL AND CRIMINAL RECORD INFORMATION
Nearly every state regulates how consumers’ financial and
criminal record information may be collected and disclosed; these
are, in essence, reputation-protecting provisions. However, given
recent developments in the economy and data technology, this may
be a suitable time to adjust these laws to better balance the privacy
interests of consumers against the information interests of employers,
banks, and insurance companies.
The Great Recession inflicted tremendous damage to credit
records by causing widespread unemployment and depressing
housing values, putting great stress on the ability of many to repay
debts. 1 Those defaults and delays in payment have been duly amassed
by the consumer reporting agencies that publish credit reports about
consumers and compute their credit scores. Seeing this information
about those hurt by economic blows may make employers less likely
to hire them, landlords less likely to rent to them, and insurers less
likely to insure them (or willing to insure them, but only at
elevated premiums).
Aside from the economic environment, advances in data
technology have increased our ability to view public records across
the country, leading many to be marked by visible criminal records
incurred even decades ago—records that many might have thought

1. An analysis by the Fair Isaac Corporation concluded that credit scores “for
approximately 50 million people declined more than 20 points” during the 2008–09 period.
FICOBLOG,
Rachel
Bell,
Recession
Causes
FICO
Score
Swings,
FICO:
http://www.fico.com/en/blogs/risk-compliance/recession-causes-fico-score-swings
(last
visited Feb. 17, 2016). Credit scores then largely rebounded in the subsequent two years. Id.;
see also Credit Scores Drop During Recession: Are You Worried about Your Score?, ABC NEWS
(Mar. 21, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/credit-scores-drop-millions-americansrecession-world-news/story?id=11142553 (noting that “more than [25%] of Americans . . .
[had a] credit score[] of 599 or lower,” in contrast to a historical norm of 15%); BARRIERS
FACING THE LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYED: STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW
PROJECT BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR AND
PENSIONS, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT 8 (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.nelp.org/page//UI/2011/Owens_Testimony_Barriers_Unemployed_12-2011.pdf?nocdn=1 (reporting that
bankruptcy filings among the unemployed rose 23% between 2008 and 2010); Jeremy Simon,
U.S.
economic
recession
shifted
FICO
credit
scores
(Sept.
27,
2011),
http://blogs.creditcards.com/2011/09/economic-recession-fico-credit-scores.php (showing
annual increases in the percent of the population with poor credit scores from 2006–09, when
they gradually began to improve).
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they had surpassed. 2 In addition, medical costs continue to accelerate
and medical debt not only spoils many otherwise solid credit reports
but has also led to a significant number of bankruptcies. 3 Finally, the
crime of identity theft has increased as data breaches become more
common, exposing sensitive financial information to thieves who can
then poison their victims’ credit reports. 4
State legislators can ameliorate the effects of some of these
historical events on their constituents’ opportunities, curbing the
impact of old credit, criminal, medical, and identity theft problems.
However, for such record-enhancing provisions to have their
intended impact, the drafters must carefully navigate the express
preemption provisions staked throughout the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (FCRA), the federal statute governing the creation and use of
credit reports. 5 Furthermore, drafters must simultaneously consider
the Supreme Court’s present stance on express and implied
preemption. The next Section discusses some of the richest
opportunities for legislatures to rebalance the interests of credit
report users against the economic recovery of consumers. These
include employers’ use of credit reports, criminal record information,
medical debt information, and identity theft content.

2. See Dara N. Lee, The Digital Scarlet Letter: The Effect of Online Criminal Records
on Crime Figure 1: Timing of Online Criminal Records, 1990–2008 (May 2011) (working
paper) (on file with the Social Science Research Network) (showing a gradual increase in states
making criminal records available online from 1990–2008, finishing with 28 states).
3. Kate Santich, Despite insurance, medical bills push family to bankruptcy, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (July 30, 2011), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-07-30/health/osmedical-bankruptcy-20110730_1_health-insurance-medical-bills-bankruptcy
(describing
trends in bankruptcies related to medical debt, and noting that “most experts interviewed said
the problem is likely only to have worsened”); Sara R. Collins et al., Insuring the Future,
Current Trends in Health Coverage and the Effects of Implementing the Affordable Care Act,
FUND
xi
(Apr.
2013),
COMMONWEALTH
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/fundreport/2013/apr/1681_collins_insuring_future_biennial_survey_2012_final.pdf
(reporting
that 75 million adults struggled with medical debt in 2012).
4. See Lisa Gerstner, What you need to know about identity theft, CHI. TRIB., May 19,
2013, at 12 (reporting that “about 12.6 million people” suffered identity theft in 2012, an
increase of nearly 8% from 2011).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012). The preemption provisions are found in 15
U.S.C. § 1681t.
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A. Employer Checks of Credit Reports
After creditors, employers may be the most visible and obvious
users of consumer credit reports and similar background checks,
reviewing them to peer into the past financial and other decisions of
both current employees and applicants in order to choose and place
their workers. According to a survey by the Society for Human
Resource Management, in 2012 approximately thirty-four percent of
employers reported that they conduct credit background checks on
some potential applicants, while another thirteen percent conduct
them on all applicants. 6
However, such information may unfairly damage an individual’s
prospects in a few ways. First, credit and other background checks
can be surprisingly inaccurate; a recent report by the Federal Trade
Commission to Congress disclosed that 21 percent of credit reports
have some sort of error in them, and 12.9 percent of the reports had
an error sufficient that the correction changed the corresponding
credit scores. 7 When this percentage is applied to millions of reports,
the number of consumers injured by mendacious reports is
disquieting. 8 Furthermore, even when a credit report is accurate, it
may blacklist otherwise qualified and competent candidates from a
job if it incorporates information that may unduly grab the attention
of its audience.
Several states perceive such reports to unfairly impede
employment, and in response have enacted provisions designed to
protect employees and job applicants from the scrutiny of a credit

6. Background Checking—The Use of Credit Background Checks in Hiring Decisions,
FOR
HUM.
RESOURCE
MGMT.
(July
19,
2012),
SOC’Y
http://www.shrm.org/research/surveyfindings/articles/pages/creditbackgroundchecks.aspx.
7. FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT TO CONG. UNDER SECTION 319 OF THE FAIR AND
ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003 iv–v (2012) (finding that 21% of the
consumers whose reports were sampled “encounter a confirmed material error on one or more
of their credit reports,” and noting that “[t]he estimated proportion of reports and consumers
who experience a credit score change resulting from modification of a credit report is higher
than previous estimates from the credit reporting industry”). For 5.2% of the consumers, the
change in score “was such that their credit risk tier decreased and thus the consumer may be
more likely to be offered a lower auto loan interest rate.” Id. at i.
8. See Richard Cordray, Prepared Remarks by Richard Cordray on Credit Reporting,
FIN.
PROTECTION
BUREAU
(July
16,
2012),
CONSUMER
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/speeches/prepared-remarks-by-richard-cordray-on-creditreporting (stating every year “3 billion credit reports are issued”).
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report check. California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington have
all passed credit history cloaking measures. 9 Guam has also passed
such a provision. 10 Other states have considered these types of
provisions without yet passing them. 11
The adopted measures typically prevent employers or others
from using a credit report in connection with employment. 12 Such
restrictions far exceed those imposed by the FCRA, which permits
employers to obtain an employee or applicant’s credit report so long
as the target has consented. 13
The history of Maryland’s law provides a typical example of the
impetus for such statutes; the bill’s sponsor introduced it to assist
“blue-collar workers having trouble making ends meet, so that they
don’t have one more hurdle to overcome.” 14 A poor credit score,
said the sponsor, does not reveal the person’s ability to perform the
job: “Having bad credit does not make someone a bad person . . . .
Costly medical problems, a messy divorce, and many other
understandable reasons to have poor credit have nothing to do with
one’s ability to do a good job.” 15 Though the business and credit
reporting communities opposed the bill when it had previously been

9. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.20.5 (2012) and CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5 (2011 &
Supp. 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-126 (2016); 7 COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 1103-4:1–11034:12 (2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt (2011 & 2016 Supp.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
19, § 711(g) (2013 & Supp. 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2(a)(8) (1993 & Supp. 2013);
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/5-70/30 (2008 & Supp. 2016); MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMP. § 3711 (2008 & Supp. 2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.570 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320
(2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i (2009 & Supp. 2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
19.182.020(2)(c) (2013).
10. 22 GUAM PUB. L. 33-35 (2015); 22 GUAM CODE ANN. § 5201(h) (enacted June
10, 2015), http://www.guamcourts.org/Compileroflaws/GCA/22gca/22gc005.PDF.
11. See, e.g., H.P. 795, 127th Leg., 1st Sess. (Me. 2015); H. File 233, 85th Gen.
Assemb. (Iowa 2013); S.B. 80, 188th Gen. Court. (Mass. 2013); S.B. 145, 52d Leg., 1st Sess.
(N.M. 2015); Assemb. 1799, 236th Sess. (N.Y. 2013); Assemb. 2148, 236th Sess. (N.Y.
2013); S.B. 699, 108th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2013); H.B. 2532, 81st Reg. Sess.
(W. Va. 2013).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 19 to 30.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b) (2012).
14. Laura Bassett, Maryland Lawmaker Reintroduces Bill To Ban Credit Checks In
POST
(Jan.
26
2011,
9:43
AM),
Hiring
Process,
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/26/maryland-job-applicant-fairnessact_n_814154.html.
15. Id.
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considered, 16 the bill eventually passed in 2011 as the effects of the
recession wore on. 17
Though employers may insist that credit reports aid their
decision-making process, empirical data has not appeared to establish
a material link between an employee’s credit record and that
employee’s job performance. In considering its credit history bill, for
example, the Oregon legislature elicited testimony from an employee
of one of the major credit reporting agencies, TransUnion, and
learned that the agency did not have any evidence that an employee’s
credit history correlated with subsequent job performance, casting
doubts on the validity of such a check. 18
Credit history-cloaking laws have some common features. In
general, the statutes apply to similar types of information—reports
that contain information about the applicant’s credit history 19—and
typically, they forbid employers from discriminating on the basis of
credit information. 20 The strictest laws prohibit employers from even
obtaining a report. 21 Connecticut has the weakest prohibition which
merely bars employers from requiring an employee or applicant to
consent to a request for a credit report—without prohibiting an
16. Id.
17. The bill, 2011 Maryland Laws Ch. 28 (S.B. 132) (H.B. 87), was passed on
April 12, 2011.
18. Economic Fairness Oregon, Testimony on Oregon’s Job Applicant Fairness Act,
VIMEO (May 31, 2011, 3:02 PM), http://www.vimeo.com/24479508.
19. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.20.5(a) (2012); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a)
(2011 & Supp. 2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt(b) (2011 & Supp. 2016); 820 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 70/5 (2008 & Supp. 2016); MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMP. § 3-711(b) (2008 &
Supp. 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. § 495i(a)(2), (3) (2009 & Supp. 2015); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 19.182.020(2)(c) (2013); 22 GUAM CIV. CODE ANN. § 5201(h) (enacted June 10,
2015), http://www.guamcourts.org/Compileroflaws/GCA/22gca/22gc005.PDF.
20. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a) (2011 & Supp. 2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §
711(g)(1) (2013 & Supp. 2014) (applies only to public employers and during the “initial
application process”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2(a)(8) (1993 & Supp. 2013); 820 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 70/10(a) (2008 & Supp. 2016); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 600-A(1) (2007); MD.
CODE ANN. LAB. & EMP. § 3-711(b), (c) (2008 & Supp. 2015) (use for a non-prohibited
purpose); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320(1) (2015); 21 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i(b) (2009
& Supp. 2015); 22 GUAM CODE ANN. § 5201(h) (enacted June 10, 2015)
http://www.guamcourts.org/Compileroflaws/GCA/22gca/22gc005.PDF. Nevada comes
close to prohibiting the acquisition of a report, forbidding employers from inquiring
concerning a consumer credit report. NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.570(1)–(3) (2013).
21. OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320(1) (2015); VT. STAT. ANN. § 495i(b)(2) (2009 &
Supp. 2015) (forbidding employers from “[i]nquir[ing] about an applicant or employee’s
credit report or credit history”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.182.020(2)(c) (2013).
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employer from making the request, applicants might not feel free to
deny permission. 22
Of course, these prohibitions have exceptions, some of which
threaten to swallow the rule. For instance, most laws exempt some
types of management positions, 23 and positions involving financial
institutions or monetary transactions, 24 as well as law enforcement.25
Certain other governmental employers are also commonly exempt. 26
22. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt(b) (2011 & Supp. 2016).
23. CAL. LAB. CODE 1024.5(a)(1) (2011 & Supp. 2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
31-51tt(a)(4)(A) (2011 & Supp. 2016) (defining qualifying managerial positions), (C)
(defining qualifying fiduciary positions), (b) (providing the exemption); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26, § 600-A(2)(A) (2007) (“management of the company’s finances or a customer’s
financial assets”); MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMP. § 3-711(c)(1)(ii) (2008 & Supp. 2015)
(exempting positions for which the employer has a “bona fide purpose”), (c)(2)(i) (defining
those positions for which an employer has a bona fide purpose as including specified
managerial positions); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.580(3)(c) (2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
495i(c)(1)(E) (2009 & Supp. 2015) (positions requiring “a financial fiduciary responsibility to
the employer or a client of the employer”); see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.7(a)(1) (1993 &
Supp. 2013) (credit history is “related to a bona fide occupational requirement” and the
“employee has received a conditional offer of employment”), 378-2.7(a)(3) (the position is
“managerial or supervisory”); 22 GUAM CODE ANN. § 5201(h)(2) (enacted June 10, 2015)
http://www.guamcourts.org/Compileroflaws/GCA/22gca/22gc005.PDF (“the position is
managerial and involves setting the direction or control of the business”). Illinois exempts
those positions for which “a satisfactory credit history is an established bona fide occupational
requirement,” a feature that requires the presence of at least one of seven designated
circumstances, one of which is that the position is managerial. 820 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 70/10(b)(4).
24. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(b) (2011 & Supp. 2016) (institutions covered by the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809); 1024.5(a)(5)(A)–(C) (access to bank or
credit card information along with an individual’s date of birth and social security number,
excluding routine credit card transactions); 1024.5(a)(6) (positions in which an employee
would have authority over specified financial matters); 1024.5(a)(8) (positions involving
regular access to cash totaling $10,000 or more); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt((b)(1)
(2011 & Supp. 2016) (financial institutions); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.7(a)(4) (1993 &
Supp. 2013); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/5 (excluding from the definition of “employer”); 820
ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/10(b)(2)–(3) (duties of the position include “access to cash or . . . assets
worth $2500 or more,” or “signatory power over . . . assets of $100 or more”); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 600-A(2)(B) (2007) (“employer is in the financial services industry”);
MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMP. § 3-711(c)(2)(iii)–(iv) (2008 & Supp. 2015) (involves a
fiduciary responsibility, including collecting payments, and for those who are provided an
expense account or corporate debit or credit card); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.580(3)(a) (2013);
OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320(2)(a) (2015) (“federally insured banks or credit unions”); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i(c)(1)(B), (C), and (G) (2009 & Supp. 2015) (“access to
confidential financial information,” “employer is a financial institution,” or “access to an
employer’s payroll information,” respectively); 22 GUAM CODE ANN. § 5201(h)(4), (6)
(enacted
June
10,
2015)
http://www.guamcourts.org/Compileroflaws/GCA/22gca/22gc005.PDF (“[The] position
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A few states weaken their general prohibitions by exempting a
catch-all category of positions for which an employer may rely on a
credit report, rather than limiting exemptions to specific categories.
For instance, Oregon and Washington permit an employer to obtain
and act upon a credit report when the report’s information is
“substantially job-related.” 27 Vermont permits employers to use
credit reports where “[t]he employer can demonstrate that the
information is a valid and reliable predictor of employee performance

involve[s] access to customers’, employees’, or the employer’s personal or financial information
other than information customarily provided in a retail transaction . . . , [or] includes an
expense account.”).
25. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a)(3) (2011 & Supp. 2016); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 70/5(3) (excluding from the definition of “employer”); NEV. REV. STAT. §
613.580(3)(d) (2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320(2)(c) (2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
495i(c)(1)(D) (2009 & Supp. 2015) (law enforcement, emergency medical personnel
and firefighters).
26. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a)(2) (2011 & Supp. 2016) (for positions with the state
department of justice); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/5(4) (where a state or local agency requires a
credit report as a condition of employment); 70/10(b)(7) (where “[t]he employee’s . . . credit
history is . . . required by or exempt under federal or State law”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
19.182.020(c)(2) (2013). Other typical exemptions include positions for which another law
requires the employer to examine an applicant’s credit report, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.20.5
(2012) (requiring the report’s user to identify a specific permissible basis) and CAL. LAB.
CODE § 1024.5(a)(4) (2011 & Supp. 2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt(b)(2) (2011
& Supp. 2016); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/10(b)(1) (“[s]tate or federal law requires bonding”
of the “individual holding the position”), 70/10(b)(7) (federal or state law otherwise requires
the employee’s credit history); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 600-A(2)(C) (2007); OR. REV.
STAT. § 659A.320(2)(b) (2015). Some states also exempt those positions that grant the
employee access to confidential customer or trade secret information. CAL. CIV. CODE §
1785.20.5 (2012) (requiring the report’s user to identify a specific permissible basis) and CAL.
LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a)(5),(7) (2011 & Supp. 2016) (providing, among other positions
permitting the use of a report, those where the employee would have regular access to bank or
credit card information, social security numbers, and date of birth, excluding routine credit
card transactions, and positions with access to designated confidential or proprietary
information); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt(b)(4)(E) (2011 & Supp. 2016) (access to
customer information or confidential or proprietary business information); MD. CODE ANN.
LAB. & EMP. 3-711(c)(2)(v) (2008 & Supp. 2015) (access to confidential business
information); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/10(b)(5); see also 22 Guam Code Ann. § 5201(h)(3)
(enacted
June
10,
2015)
http://www.guamcourts.org/Compileroflaws/GCA/22gca/22gc005.PDF (“[T]he position
meets criteria in specified federal or state administrative rules to establish the circumstances
when a credit history is a bona fide occupational requirement.”).
27. OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320(2)(d) (2015) (though requiring the employer to
disclose its reasons for obtaining the report to the applicant or employee); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 19.182.020(c)(i) (2013).
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in the specific position of employment.” 28 Hawaii also allows some
scrutiny of an employee’s credit history, but only once the employer
has extended a conditional offer of employment to the target, thus
permitting the employer to withdraw the offer only if the history is
“directly related to a bona fide occupational qualification.” 29
Nevada’s general exception is so broad that it nearly eviscerates the
general prohibition, allowing employers to review credit reports
when such information is “reasonably related” to the position. 30
Notwithstanding these weakening exceptions, however, credit
history-cloaking laws indicate a trend of increasing privacy—a
recognition that simply because information is available does not
necessarily mean that it should be seen or used. Such laws install
boundaries around an individual’s financial life and implicitly
acknowledge that employees have a sphere of existence outside of
their employment.
B. Criminal Record Information
In addition to examining applicants’ credit history information,
many employers want to know their criminal record history as well.
One 2012 survey by the Society for Human Resource Management
reveals that sixty-nine percent of employers investigate the criminal
background of every applicant. 31 Such public record information has
become much more widely available; at one time, a comprehensive
criminal background check would have required a county-by-county
visit to clerks’ counters; now so many records are available online
that an individual’s record can be checked from one’s own desk, or
even from a smartphone. 32
While it seems intuitive that employers would want to know of
any criminal taint in an applicant’s past, employee advocates worry
that a criminal record—even a simple single record of arrest—can
28. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i(c)(1)(F) (2009 & Supp. 2015).
29. HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.7(a)(1) (1993 & Supp. 2013).
30. NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.580(3) (2013). The provision designates nine types of
duties for which “credit information shall be deemed reasonably related,” but does not provide
that the designated duties are exclusive. Id. In addition, Nevada allows employers access to
employee’s credit information whenever another law authorizes it. Id. § 613.580(1).
31. Background Checking, supra note 6.
32. Federal Trade Comm’n, FTC Warns Marketers That Mobile Apps May Violate Fair
Credit Reporting Act (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/02/mobileapps.shtm.

374

01.DEARMOND.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

365

8/11/2016 3:15 PM

Preventing Preemption

unjustifiably wall off a candidate from consideration for a position
that does not necessarily require an unblemished background. 33 For
one thing, sheer numbers indicate that many will suffer the
“collateral consequences” of a criminal record: 8.6 percent of
American adults have a felony conviction, and approximately 65
million Americans have some kind of criminal record. 34 Accordingly,
advocacy groups such as the National Employment Law Project have
urged states to reform their employment laws to reduce the impact
of a criminal background on an otherwise qualified applicant. 35
The FCRA—the federal act governing consumer reports—does
not prohibit the publication of criminal convictions in credit reports
at all. 36 In contrast, the statute requires that records of arrest along
with other “adverse item[s] of information” disappear from reports
after seven years. 37 This latter “catch-all” provision should encompass
other criminal record information, such as indications of probation
or parole. 38 However, the FCRA lifts the seven-year limit for jobs
that can “reasonably be expected” to draw a salary of $75,000 or
more, 39 a figure that has not risen since 1996, and likely allows
employers to examine criminal record histories for an ever-growing
pool of positions. 40
Unlike the FCRA, some state credit reporting statutes restrict
agencies from putting certain non-conviction criminal record
information into consumer reports. 41 These restrictions vary widely.
New York, with one of the more robust provisions, flatly prohibits
agencies from reporting criminal arrest information for past charges
unless the individual was convicted of the offense or the “charges are

33. State Reforms Reducing Collateral Consequences for People with Criminal Records:
2011–2012 Legislative Round-Up, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, (Sept. 2012),
http://nelp.3cdn.net/6ab3d3b51b9490b40c_cnm6b847q.pdf.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1–2.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(5).
37. § 1681c(a)(2) (“records of arrest”); § 1681c(a)(5) ([a]ny other adverse item
of information).
38. See Russell, FTC Informal Staff Opinion Letter (Jan. 21, 1974).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(b)(3).
40. Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 2406(a)(2), 110 Stat. 3009 (amending 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681c(b)).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 45−51.
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still pending.” 42 Furthermore, the state prohibits the reporting of
criminal convictions more than seven years old unless an exception
applies. 43 Similarly, California prohibits not only the reporting of
criminal record information that is more than seven years old, but
also the reporting of any arrests, indictments, or similar information
where no conviction followed or where the conviction was
pardoned. 44 Kentucky likewise prohibits agencies from keeping
information about Kentucky state criminal charges unless a
conviction resulted. 45
Nonetheless, state law exclusions of criminal record information
are often subject to an exclusion, returning otherwise prohibited
information to an employee’s credit report in situations similar to the
FCRA’s salary threshold exception. 46 For instance, Washington
prohibits records of arrest, indictment, or conviction that predate the
report by more than seven years. 47 However, Washington’s statute,
and those of New Hampshire, Maryland and Kansas, lift the cloak on
prohibited criminal record information for jobs that could reasonably
be expected to draw a salary of $20,000 or more. 48 Thus, while the
FCRA protects job applicants who expect to earn between $20,000
and $75,000 from information about criminal arrests that are more
than seven years old, these state statutes do not. Similarly, New York
allows the continued reporting of criminal convictions where the
user is seeking to employ the individual for an annual salary of
$25,000 or more. 49 Maine, Colorado, and Texas align themselves
42. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 380-j(a)(1) (McKinney 2012). The statute does permit a
consumer reporting agency to disclose the “detention of . . . [the consumer] by a retail
mercantile establishment” so long as he or she “has executed an uncoerced admission of
wrongdoing,” and received a prescribed notice from the establishment. § 380-j(b).
43. § 380-j(f)(1)(v).
44. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.13(a)(6) (2012).
45. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.310 (2015). Since this provision was enacted in 1980, it
is exempt from the FCRA preemption provision that might otherwise apply to it. See 15
U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(E) (exempting state laws that were in effect on September 30, 1996);
infra text accompanying notes 196 to 207 (addressing the issue of the FCRA’s preemption of
state laws concerning criminal record information).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 39−40.
47. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.182.040 (2013).
48. MD. CODE. ANN., COM. LAW § 14-1203(b)(3) (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50704(b)(3) (2005 & Supp. 2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-B:5(II)(c) (2009); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. 19.182.040(2) (2013).
49. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 380-(j)(f)(2)(iii) (McKinney 2012).
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with the federal act, permitting criminal record reporting for those
earning $75,000 or more. 50 In contrast, Massachusetts, Montana,
and California maintain the exclusion of criminal record information
from consumer reports regardless of the expected salary of the
particular employment position. 51
Some states address this issue by restricting employers, as
opposed to restricting the contents of credit reports. 52 For instance, a
state might prohibit an employer from inquiring about an applicant’s
criminal record until the application process has progressed to a
particular point. 53
Notwithstanding their weaknesses, these measures display
attempts by states to calibrate the appropriate balance between the
privacy of an individual’s past and an employer’s legitimate interest
in that past, revealing reasonably relevant information while cloaking
the rest.
C. Medical Debt Restrictions
While the rising impact of criminal record information on
consumer reports likely arises from enhanced conversion of archived
paper records to electronic ones—that is, an increase in the
accessibility of information—the growth in the number of consumer
credit records tarnished by medical debt may come from the

50. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-14.3-105.3(2)(c) (2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 1309 (2009 & Supp. 2015) (incorporating the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act by
reference); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 20.05(b)(3) (2015).
51. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 52 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-3-112
(2015); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.13 (2012).
52. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-13–45 (2013 & Supp. 2015) (prohibiting
employers from inquiring about criminal convictions until after making a conditional offer of
employment, but providing exceptions); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:6B-11–19 (2011 & Supp.
2015) (prohibiting employers from inquiring about an applicant’s criminal record during the
initial employment application process, or from providing in an advertisement that the
employer will not consider applicants with criminal records, but providing exceptions); 2015
OR. LAWS § 559 (declaring it to be an unlawful practice for an employer to “exclude an
applicant from an initial interview solely because of a past criminal conviction” but providing
exceptions); see also MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 10-301–06 (2010) (instituting a
process to shield criminal record information, and prohibiting employers and educational
institutions from requiring applicants to disclose shielded information, with exceptions).
53. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:6B-11–19 (2011 & Supp. 2015) (prohibiting
employers from inquiring about an applicant’s criminal record during the initial employment
application process, but providing exceptions).
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increased financial burden that rising health care costs put on many
Americans. 54 Medical debt is one of the leading causes of
bankruptcies in America. 55 As the costs of medical care have soared
out of proportion to the rate of inflation and as incomes at most job
levels have remained stagnant—or have even fallen (along with
employment rates)—Americans increasingly find themselves
burdened with medical debt that may appear on and taint their
credit reports. 56 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)
reported that over half of the collections tradelines on a group of
credit reports it studied consisted of medical debt. 57 Even one single
medical bill can keep someone from receiving credit at a desirable
rate, or perhaps from receiving credit at all. 58 But no one has
demonstrated a clear link between financial competence and medical
debt, and it is not intuitively obvious that such a link exists, as few
people voluntarily or frivolously take on expensive medical care. In
fact, one study by the CFPB indicated that consumers with medical
debt were a better risk than consumers with other sorts of debts in
collection and that many of them “ordinarily pay their other financial

54. See, e.g., Adrianne Kroepsch, Report Finds Medical Debt Increasing,
COMMONWEALTH
FUND
(Feb.
27,
2007),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Newsletters/Washington-Health-Policy-inReview/2007/Mar/Washington-Health-Policy-Week-in-Review—-March-5—-2007/ReportFinds-Medical-Debt-Increasing.aspx. Though consumers’ share of overall spending has
decreased, overall bills have risen because the cost of health care has been growing so quickly.
Sarah Kliff, Patients’ share of health spending is shrinking. Yes, really, WASH. POST (Feb. 5,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/05/out-ofpocket-health-spending-is-shrinking-yes-really/.
55. One scholar testified that in 2007, 69.1% of bankruptcies included medical bills of
$1,000 or more—a 49.6% increase in the comparable percentage from 2001. Written
Testimony of Steffie Woolhandler Before the H. Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Admin. and
(July
28,
2009),
Commercial
Law,
HOUSE.GOV
http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/pdf/Woolhandler090728.pdf.
56. See Kathy Kristof, Getting sick can kill your credit score, CBS MONEYWATCH (May
21, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/getting-sick-can-kill-your-credit-score/; Kate
Santich, Medical Bills Can Bankrupt Insured, ORLANDO SENTINEL A1 (July 31, 2011).
57. CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS: A STUDY
OF
MEDICAL
AND
NON-MEDICAL
COLLECTIONS
(2014),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201412_cfpb_reports_consumer-credit-medical-and-nonmedical-collections.pdf.
58. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, When Health Costs Harm Your Credit, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/09/sunday-review/when-health-costs-harmyour-credit.html?_r=0.
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obligations on time.” 59 Furthermore, errors in medical accounts are
notoriously common, 60 so people may find themselves blacklisted for
debts that they have not actually incurred, or debts for which an
insurance company is responsible. 61 The weak relationship between
medical debt and credit worthiness led the credit scoring company
Fair Isaac to reduce the impact of some types of medical debt in its
trademarked FICO credit scoring algorithm. 62
While no state prohibits outright the inclusion of medical debt in
a consumer report or in calculating a credit score, Congress recently
considered a bill that would have amended the FCRA to remove
from consumer reports information regarding any medical debt that
was eventually paid off or settled, thus clearing the usual seven year
stickiness. 63 States could consider imposing similar restrictions on
consumer reporting agencies in order to prevent consumers’ reports
from being hurt to a degree that is disproportionate to their actual
willingness to pay debts. A more dramatic and helpful provision
would be to remove medical debts from consumer reports entirely.
D. Identity Theft Provisions
Identity theft, an Internet-powered phenomenon, has caused
intense misery to its hapless victims, who may find themselves

59. CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, supra note 57 at 7, 38.
60. Estimates of errors in medical bills range from 30% to 80%. Jessica SilverGreenberg, How to Fight a Bogus Bill, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2011),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703312904576146371931841968.
61. See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, supra note 57, at 39–42 (describing
the complexity and lack of transparency of medical costs, insurance coverage, and the
billing process).
62. See FICO Score 9 Introduces Refined Analysis of Medical Collections, FICO (Aug. 7,
2014),
http://www.fico.com/en/about-us/newsroom/news-releases/fico-score-9introduces-refined-analysis-medical-collections/ (“This will help ensure that medical
collections have a lower impact on the score, commensurate with the credit risk they
represent.”). This adaptation reveals that legislation may not be the only source of relief to
consumers struggling to borrow in the face of existing medical debt. Another source may be
software such as FICO Score 9.
63. S. 160, The Medical Debt Responsibility Act of 2013 § 3, 113th Cong., 1st Sess.
(2013) (proposing an amendment to 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a), the obsolescence provision
described supra, that would delete from credit reports “[a]ny information related to a fully
paid or settled medical debt that had been characterized as delinquent, charged off, or in
collection which, from the date of payment or settlement, antedates the report by more than
45 days”).
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shadowed by a pernicious doppelganger whose spendthrift records
cannot be purged from their credit histories. The Federal Trade
Commission reported that it received 490,220 complaints about
identity theft in 2015, up 47 percent from 2014. 64 Fundamentally,
the relationship between identity theft and a credit report is one of
inaccuracy. To illustrate, once a thief obtains goods, credit, or
services in the identity theft victim’s name and then fails to pay for
them, the lender wrongly ascribes the debt to the victim of the theft,
rather than to the thief. The debt shows up not on the thief’s credit
report, but on the victim’s credit report.
States have been contending with the rising impact of identity
theft on consumers’ credit reports. As an example, New Mexico
enacted a statute that sought to allow identity theft victims to block
a thief’s debt from appearing on their credit reports. Under this law,
once a consumer reporting agency receives a proper notice from an
identity theft victim identifying information reported to or by the
consumer reporting agency that is the product of identity theft, the
agency must remove that information from the victim’s file. 65 The
agency may restore the information only if the consumer requests it
or if ordered by a court after adjudicating the alleged debt. 66 The
provision significantly overlaps with one in the federal FCRA, but
the federal statute gives consumer reporting agencies a good deal
more leeway to decline to block an identity theft debt. 67 The FCRA
permits a consumer reporting agency to decline to block an item of
information sua sponte if it determines that (A) the agency
mistakenly blocked it, (B) the consumer misrepresented a material
fact about the information, or (C) the consumer obtained goods,
services, or money as a result of the blocked transaction. 68 The
agency’s right to act unilaterally can eviscerate the protection the
provision intends to give to identity theft victims.

64. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK FOR
JANUARY–DECEMBER
2015,
6,
82
(2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/consumer-sentinel-network-databook-january-december-2015/160229csn-2015databook.pdf.
65. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-3A-2(D), 56-3A-3.1(A), (D) (2010).
66. § 56-3A-3.1(E) (2010).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2(c).
68. § 1681c-2(c)(1)(A)–(C).
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Thus, these four areas of concern—(i) employer use of consumer
reports, (ii) criminal record information in consumer reports, (iii)
medical debt in consumer reports, and (iv) the effects of identity
theft on consumer reports—are fertile for state intervention in order
to protect citizens from the disproportionate consequences of their
failures. However, state legislation must avoid preemption by the
federal Fair Credit Reporting Act in order to be effective. The
following section discusses general principles of preemption and
analyzes some of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in the area
of preemption.
III. THE THREE VARIETIES OF PREEMPTION AND THE SUPREME
COURT’S RECENT PREEMPTION DECISIONS
The Supreme Court has taken up the issue of preemption in a
fistful of cases over the last several years. These cases will guide the
preemptive effect of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act on state
innovations intended to improve the privacy of their citizens’
historical records.
As a basic matter, the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution is the mechanism that elevates federal laws over state
laws. The second clause of Article VI provides that the laws of the
United States “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary
notwithstanding.” Obviously, federal and state laws can peacefully
co-exist—our system encourages simultaneous federal and state
authority. 69 As just one example, the federal government protects
consumers against unfair and deceptive trade practices through the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 while states do so through similar
state laws. 71 Nonetheless, under limited circumstances, federal law
will neutralize an overlapping state law. This phenomenon by which
federal law supersedes overlapping state laws is called preemption.

69. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012) (“Federalism, central to
the constitutional design, adopts the principle that both the National and State Governments
have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect.”).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
71. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750–1785 (2012); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 510/1–
510/7 (2015); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 349-50-f-1 (McKinney 2015).

381

01.DEARMOND.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

8/11/2016 3:15 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2016

Preemption occurs in three basic varieties: (i) field, (ii) express,
and (iii) implied. Of these, it can be argued that express preemption
most influences the viability of state credit reporting restrictions.
A. Field Preemption: “[S]o pervasive . . . or so dominant” 72
Field preemption preempts the most extensively; it clears an
entire subject area from state regulation, reserving it for federal
dominion. 73 There are two types of field preemption. The first
measures breadth and allows federal law to override any state law in
the same field where the federal law’s framework is “so pervasive” it
leaves no room for state regulation. 74 The second measures intensity
and occurs when the federal interest is “so dominant that the federal
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the
same subject.” 75 For instance, anti-sedition is one area the Supreme
Court has found subject to field preemption. 76
B. Express Preemption: “[A] fair but narrow reading” 77
While field preemption can exist without any action by Congress,
express preemption arises only when Congress plants specific
language in a federal act to target state legislation. 78 Even though the
language may be explicit, however, courts must still construe it when
evaluating its impact on a specific state provision, which raises the
question of how they should do so: broadly, narrowly, or somewhere
in between.

72. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
73. See, e.g., Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595, 1599 (2015)
(describing field preemption as arising when “Congress may have intended ‘to foreclose any
state regulation in the area,’ irrespective of whether state law is consistent or inconsistent with
‘federal standards,’” and holding that the federal Natural Gas Act did not preempt state
antitrust lawsuits) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
74. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501.
75. Id.; see also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 488 (2008) (holding that
the Clean Water Act’s penalties for water pollution did not preempt maritime common law on
punitive damages, stating that “we see no clear indication of congressional intent to occupy the
entire field of pollution remedies”).
76. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956).
77. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 80 (2008).
78. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500.
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The Supreme Court recently examined express preemption in
the 2013 decision of Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 79 an action
that pitted a consumer whose car had been towed and sold without
his consent against a federal law that the defendant, the towing
authority, asserted barred any state claim by the consumer. This
decision followed three significant 2008 decisions about express
preemption: Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 80 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,81
and Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass’n. 82 Taken together,
the four cases illustrate that so long as the federal provision leaves
some space for states to occupy, the Court is willing to allow states
to fill that area.
Examining the opinion reveals first that an express preemption
provision that preempts state laws “with respect to” a designated
area that federal law regulates will receive a compact reading. 83 In
Dan’s City, the unhappy former car owner sued the towing company
under a state consumer protection law that prescribed specific
procedures for the storage and sale of a towed vehicle, procedures
that he alleged the towing company failed to comply with. 84 The
defendant relied on a preemption provision of the Federal Aviation
Administration Authorization Act (known by the ungainly acronym
“FAAAA”), which appeared to reach broadly into state domains.
This provision stated that “a State . . . may not enact or enforce a
law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law
related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with
respect to the transportation of property.” 85
The phrase “related to” reflects “a broad pre-emptive purpose.” 86
Nevertheless, the Court held that even such a broad phrase “does
not mean the sky is the limit;” it “does not preempt state laws
affecting carrier prices, routes, and services ‘in only a “tenuous,
remote, or peripheral . . . manner.” 87 The Court cautioned that the

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

133 S. Ct. 1769 (2013).
555 U.S. 70 (2008).
552 U.S. 312 (2008).
552 U.S. 364 (2008).
See Altria, 555 U.S. at 80–81.
133 S. Ct. at 1775; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 262:36-a (2014).
49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
Dan’s City, 133 S. Ct. at 1778.
Id. (quoting Rowe, 552 U.S. at 371).
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“related to” language could not have too broad and literal an effect,
else “‘for all practical purposes pre-emption would never run its
course.’” 88 In this particular provision, the “related to” language was
further limited by the phrase “with respect to the transportation of
property.” 89 In determining the effect of the language, the Court
focused on the different time periods involved. The federal Act
addressed the period in which a particular vehicle was transported
and stored, while the plaintiff’s state law claims addressed not the
transport of the car, but the period of sale—well after the car had
been towed. This distinction maintained the vitality of the state
statutory scheme related to the sale of towed cars as well as the state
common law bailment claims. 90
To check its analysis, the Court examined the purpose behind
Congress’s enactment of the Act’s preemption provision, and
concluded that the state law claims would not in any way interfere
with that purpose, which was to prevent states from “constrain[ing]
participation in interstate commerce.” 91
The preference for reading broad preemption language narrowly
reflected in Dan’s City also prevailed in Altria. The state statute in
question was Maine’s Unfair Trade Practices Act, 92 whose primary
express preemption provision provided as follows: “No requirement
or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under
State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the
provisions of this chapter.” 93 The petitioners—cigarette
manufacturers—alleged that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and

88. Id. (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995)).
89. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).
90. Dan’s City, 133 S. Ct. at 1779.
91. Id. at 1780. In that same term, the Supreme Court construed this preempting
provision of the FAAAA and concluded that it preempted a local requirement regarding
placard and parking. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of L.A., 133 S. Ct. 2096, 2104 (2013).
There, however, the issue was not whether the requirement related, as a substantive matter, to
“a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of
property,” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), but rather whether the requirement “ha[d] the force and
effect of law.’” Id. at 2102, 2104.
92. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 72 (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §
207 (Supp. 2008).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
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Advertising Act preempted the respondents’ claims under the state
statute. 94 The respondents were users of petitioners’ “light”
cigarettes who brought a state law unfair trade practices claim in
response to advertisements that claimed the “light” cigarettes passed
less tar and nicotine to consumers than regular cigarettes 95—the
respondents alleged that the manufacturers knew that this was not
so. 96 The manufacturers rebutted that the Labeling Act’s express
preemption provision preempted the state statute and therefore
barred the smokers’ claims. 97
Thus, the question was whether the Maine Unfair Trade
Practices Act, when applied to challenge the “light” cigarette
advertisement, constituted a state law “based on smoking and
health . . . with respect to the advertising or promotion of any
cigarettes . . . .”98 The Court construed the phrase “based on
smoking and health” as modifying the state law taken as a whole, as
opposed to the particular application of the law. 99 Thus, the Court
stepped back from the context of the immediate application of the
state law and looked at the law itself—was it one “based on smoking
and health”? The Court reasoned that the clause should be given “‘a
fair but narrow reading.’” 100 The Act said nothing about either
“smoking” or “health,” 101 but rather targeted deceptive statements
that induced the respondents to buy the petitioners’ cigarettes,
imposing a general duty not to deceive, rather than one bound to
smoking and health. 102 Thus, the express preemption provision did
not preempt an action under a state’s general deceptive trade
practices statute. 103

94. Altria, 555 U.S. at 72.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 80–88. The manufacturers also argued that the state law was preempted
under a theory of implied obstacle preemption. Id. at 88–90. This aspect of Altria is discussed
infra in Section II.B.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2012).
99. 555 U.S. at 80.
100. Id. (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524 (1992)).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 82–83.
103. Id. at 87 (“In sum, we conclude now, as the plurality did in Cipollone, that ‘the
phrase “based on smoking and health” fairly but narrowly construed does not encompass the
more general duty not to make fraudulent statements.’”).
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However, in two other recent express preemption cases, the
Court concluded that the federal statute’s preemption provision did
in fact squelch the state law at issue. 104 From these cases we discern
first that a federal law that targets state “requirements” and
“prohibitions” extends to state common law torts in addition to
state statutes. Second, the Court will examine the policies behind the
federal law and the overlapping state law and will be more likely to
find preemption when those policies promote different goals. In
addition, the Court has indicated that it will honor specific
boundaries, even if they cover a broad expanse, and will find
preempted even generally applicable common law. 105
An expansive preemption provision written in concrete terms will
be given expansive preemption power. In Riegel v. Medtronic, the
Court construed the express preemption provision of the federal
Medical Device Amendments Act (MDA). 106 This provision was
quite broad, providing that a state shall not apply to the device “any
requirement . . . which is different from, or in addition to, any
requirement applicable” under federal law. 107 In effect, this provision
left room for the states to enact only an identical twin of the
federal provision.
Riegel’s petitioners, a husband and wife, sued the manufacturer
of a catheter under state strict liability, negligence, and similar laws
after the device ruptured. 108 First, the Court concluded that the
FDA’s premarket approval process imposed “requirements” under
the MDA, activating the statute’s preemption provision. 109 Thus, the
next question was whether the state’s common law claim was a
“requirement . . . different from, or in addition to” that premarket
approval. Common law duties are, the Court concluded,
“requirements” for purposes of an express preemption provision.110
104. Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364 (2008); Riegel v.
Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
105. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 312.
106. Id.
107. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
108. 552 U.S. at 319–21.
109. Id. at 322.
110. Id. at 324. The Court reasoned, “Congress is entitled to know what meaning this
Court will assign to terms regularly used in its enactments.” Id. The Court had previously
interpreted a federal preemption provision’s use of “requirements” as including state common
law duties. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
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The petitioners, unfortunately, failed to pursue an argument that
their state law claims nonetheless survived as requirements that were
simply parallel to, as opposed to different from or in addition to that
of the federal law, and thus lost their case once the Court concluded
that their claims constituted “requirements.” 111
Even where an express preemption provision is less expansive,
preemption becomes more likely when the federal and state laws
have fundamentally different purposes and the state law’s purpose
coincides with the motivation behind the federal law’s express
preemption provision. In Rowe v. New Hampshire Transport Ass’n,112
the Court examined the preemption language of the Federal
Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, 113 the same
statute that the Court addressed five years later in Dan’s City. 114 The
language of the preemption provision was as follows: “a State . . .
may not enact or enforce a law . . . related to a price, route, or
service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of
property.” 115 Maine, hoping to cut back on minors’ use of tobacco,
had enacted two provisions that imposed specific requirements for
the transport and delivery of tobacco products. 116 The federal statute
518 U.S. 470 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). The Court
rejected the petitioners’ argument that even if common law duties were “requirements,” they
were not requirements “with respect to devices,” reasoning that the statutory text did not
“suggest[] that the pre-empted state requirement must apply only to the relevant device . . . .”
Riegel, 552 U.S. at 328; see also Premium Mortg. Corp. v. Equifax, Inc., 583 F.3d 103, 106
(2d Cir. 2009) (construing the language of an FCRA preemption provision, 15 U.S.C. §
1681t(b), that referred to a “requirement or prohibition” under state law as encompassing
common law claims as well as statutory claims).
111. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330.
112. 552 U.S. 364 (2008).
113. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (2005).
114. Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 133 S. Ct. 1769, 1778 (2013); see supra text
accompanying notes 84 to 91.
115. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).
116. The first, imposing two requirements, forbade anyone other than a state-licensed
tobacco retailer from accepting an order for tobacco delivery, and required licensed retailers
accepting and shipping tobacco orders to use a delivery service that verifies the identity of the
recipient. Rowe, 552 U.S. at 368 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1555-C(1), C(3)(C)
(2003). The second forbade any person from knowingly transporting a tobacco product to a
person unless either the sender or the receiver had a Maine license, and designated
circumstances as deeming knowledge. Id. at 369 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1555D (2003)). These circumstances included those where “‘the package is marked as containing
tobacco and displays the name and license number of a Maine-licensed tobacco retailer’” or
the receipt of “‘the package from someone whose name appears on a list of un-licensed
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was designed to expand interstate trucking commerce by
deregulating it; in contrast, the state law was designed to improve
public health. Thus, there were two objectives in tension, at least in
this instance.
The respondents in Rowe, transport associations affected by the
state laws, challenged them, arguing that the federal act’s express
preemption provision nullified the state laws. 117 In an earlier decision,
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the Court had interpreted
similar preemptive language as applying to state enforcement actions
in connection with “‘rates, routes, or services’” even where the state
law only indirectly affected those attributes. 118 Reasoning from
Morales, the Rowe court concluded that the two Maine laws not only
had a direct “connection with” motor carrier services, but that the
provisions would have a “‘significant’ and adverse ‘impact’ in respect
of the federal Act’s ability to achieve its pre-emption-related
objectives,” thus dooming the state laws. 119 The Court also declined
to create a “public health objective” exception to the preemption
provision, though Maine tried to distinguish its laws from the sort of
economic regulation it argued Congress had intended to preempt.120
The federal law in Rowe was unusual because it sought to deregulate,
rather than regulate—to clear the table of restrictions on trucking,
whether federal or state. Thus, Maine’s laws—clearly directed
towards imposing extra burdens on the trucking industry—directly
undermined Congress’s free market intent. 121
The next case to interpret this provision of the Federal Aviation
Administration Authorization Act was Dan’s City, described supra,
which permitted rather than preempted a state law. 122 The difference
between Rowe and Dan’s City lies in the strength of the link between
the subject of the state law involved and “a price, route, or service of
any motor carrier.” 123 The state law in Dan’s City related to events

tobacco retailers that Maine’s attorney general distributes to various package-delivery
companies.’” Id. (emphasis in the opinion).
117. Id.
118. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
119. 552 U.S. at 371–73.
120. Id. at 374.
121. Id. at 371–72.
122. Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 133 S. Ct. 1769 (2013).
123. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (2012).
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after the transportation of a vehicle, a time period distinctly
subsequent to the time period with which the federal law was
concerned—the transporting period. 124 That link was too weak to
bring the state law into the orbit of the preemption provision. 125
So, taken collectively, Dan’s City, Altria, Riegel, and Rowe
indicate that a state is more likely to successfully avoid preemption
when the state law imposes a general duty, rather than an areaspecific law, and that courts will honor broad but specific boundarysetting
and
Congress’s
motivation
for
including
the
preemption provision.
C. Implied Preemption: “Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt statelaw causes of action”126
Even where a federal law does not seek to pervade a field of
regulation, and does not contain an express preemption provision, it
can still preempt an overlapping state law through implied
preemption. While field preemption removes an entire arena from
state regulation, implied preemption removes only those state laws
that conflict with a specific federal law. 127 Such a conflict can arise in
two ways. First, implied preemption negates a state law when
“compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility,” known as implied impossibility preemption. 128 Second,
a state law must give way to a federal one where it “stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes

124. Dan’s City, 133 S. Ct. at 1779.
125. Id.
126. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
127. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1981 (2011); see also Wos v.
E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1398 (2013) (“‘Where state and federal law directly
conflict,’ state law must give way.”) (citations omitted).
128. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963); see also
Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1950 (2013) (describing the doctrine).
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and objectives of Congress,” 129 undermining a policy that the federal
law promotes. This is known as implied obstacle preemption. 130
The Court’s recent implied preemption cases reflect a great deal
of deference to state schemes, so long as the area is not one that
Congress had pervasively regulated, leading to field preemption. The
Court is fond of quoting the purpose presumption: “[i]n preemption
analysis, courts should assume that ‘the historic police powers of the
States’ are not superseded ‘unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.’” 131
This presumption places a thumb on the scale in favor of leaving
state laws intact. For instance, in Wyeth v. Levine, a 2009 case of
implied preemption, the plaintiff brought a state failure to warn
claim arising from a method of administering an anti-nausea drug.132
The federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) did not contain
an express preemption clause relevant to prescription drugs. 133
However, the defendant, the drug’s manufacturer, argued that the
FDCA preempted the state law claim under two theories. First, the
defendant argued that it was impossible to comply with both the
state’s warning requirements and the FDCA. The defendant’s second
theory was that the FDCA created an obstacle such that complying
with state law would obstruct the purposes and objectives of the
federal drug labeling regulation. The Court rejected both
arguments: “We rely on the presumption because respect for the
States as ‘independent sovereigns in our federal system’ leads us to
assume that ‘Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes

129. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also Hillman, 133 S. Ct. at 1950
(describing the doctrine); Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 493–94 (1987) (stating
that “the Court must be guided by the goals and policies of [a federal act],” and concluding
that a federal law preempts if a state law claim would “serious[ly] interfere[] with the
achievement of the ‘full purposes and objectives of Congress’” or “with the methods by which
the federal statute was designed to reach” its goals) (citation omitted).
130. Thus, even without the express preemptive language in the federal statute at issue in
Rowe, Maine’s trucking laws might well have fallen to implied preemption. See Danforth v.
Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271–72 (2008) (noting the conflict between the state’s objectives
and congressional intent).
131. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009)
(quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485).
132. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565.
133. Id. at 567.
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of action.’” 134 Recent Supreme Court decisions on both implied
impossibility preemption and implied obstacle preemption are
discussed infra.
1. Implied impossibility preemption
Implied impossibility preemption arises under fairly narrow
circumstances where a regulated entity cannot comply with one
sovereign’s law without simultaneously violating that of the other.
Where a regulated entity does not maintain full control over all
contingencies needed to comply with the federal law, state law, or
both, the implied impossibility preemption doctrine will likely block
the state law, even in the absence of an actual conflict. The Supreme
Court recently nullified state law claims on the grounds of implied
impossibility by construing “impossible” broadly. 135 In PLIVA, Inc. v.
Mensing, two patients were prescribed a generic form of a
prescription drug that the defendants manufactured, and then
subsequently developed a serious neurological disorder known to be
associated with the drug. 136 They sued under their respective states’
tort laws for damages, claiming that the manufacturers should have
warned of the dangers of developing the condition for patients
taking the medication for more than twelve weeks. 137 The
preemption issue arose because Congress imposed slightly different
federal drug labeling duties on generic drug manufacturers than on
brand name drug manufacturers. 138 Under FDA regulations, a
generic drug manufacturer could acquire approval by showing that
its warning label was the same as the brand name manufacturer’s
label. 139 Under state law, the manufacturers had to “adequately and
safely label their products.” 140

134. Id. at 565 n.3 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485).
135. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
136. Id. at 2572–73.
137. Id. at 2573.
138. Id. at 2574.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2577. The issue was whether the FDA’s regulations permitted the generic
drug manufacturers to update their warning labels in a way that would meet the state law’s
requirements of “warning of [known] dangers,” (Minnesota’s law), or of “provid[ing]
adequate instructions for safe use of a product.” Id. at 2573.
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Of course, new information could require a new warning under
either the state or the federal law. However, the Court construed the
FDA’s regulations as prohibiting a unilateral change; only with the
FDA’s cooperation could the manufacturer have updated the label to
warn of the dangers associated with the neurological condition that
the plaintiffs had acquired; these dangers were discovered only after
the FDA approved the original label. 141 In other words, because the
ability to change a label was not within the manufacturer’s sole
control, the manufacturer could no longer be absolutely certain of
complying with both the federal and the state law. Since the only way
the manufacturer could have guaranteed that its labels would comply
with state law would be to have unilaterally changed them—an act
that would have violated federal law—the Court reasoned that the
doctrine of implied impossibility preemption applied to block the
state law claims.
Furthermore, if the ability to comply with the dual systems
would require the regulated party to abandon the regulated activity,
that party can claim impossibility and thus trigger preemption,
annulling the state law. 142 Subsequent to PLIVA, in the 2013 case of
Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, the Supreme Court reviewed
the labeling law involved in PLIVA and permitted a manufacturer to
claim that it could not possibly comply with a state tort duty to warn
of unreasonable dangers of a generic drug while also acceding to a
federal law’s requirement that it warn of only those dangers that the
brand-name equivalent manufacturer had attached to that product’s
label. 143 The Court thus vacated a judgment for a woman whose skin
had burned off as a side effect of a generic drug that had not
explicitly warned of the known risk of the syndrome that befell her.144
The Court specifically rejected the First Circuit’s reasoning that the
generic drug manufacturer could have complied with both the state
and federal drug laws by simply ceasing to sell the generic drug,
reasoning that the Court’s past preemption decisions did not allow

141.
142.
143.
144.
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Id. at 2578.
See Mutual Pharm. Co., v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
Id. at 2470–72.
Id. at 2476.
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for that sort of leave-the-market solution and noting that it had not
used that rationale to escape preemption in PLIVA. 145
Thus, the Court’s recent impossibility preemption cases indicate
that if the ability to comply with both state and federal law hinged
on a contingency outside the defendant’s exclusive control, the
federal law would preempt the state law. This preemption would
occur even if the defendant had partial control over the contingency
and even if the contingency were likely to fall in favor of compliance;
the defendant need not seek to resolve the conflict by withdrawing
from the market.
2. Implied obstacle preemption
Federal law will also trump a state law that “stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.” 146 This is known as implied
obstacle preemption.
Sometimes a state law will parallel a federal one, but will provide
a remedy that the federal law lacks, sprouting the question of
whether the federal claim—and its lack of a remedy—should bar the
consumer from recovering. The absence of a federal remedy does not
necessarily indicate that Congress wanted to leave consumers
without any remedy, and may in fact indicate that it expected
consumers to pursue remedies under state law. For instance, in
concluding that the FDCA did not bar an injured plaintiff’s state
failure to warn claim in Wyeth v. Levine, the Court considered the
preference for consumers to have remedies. 147 It reasoned that
Congress’s choice not to provide a federal remedy for consumers
harmed by unsafe or ineffective drugs indicated that Congress
thought “widely available state rights of action provided appropriate
relief for injured consumers.” 148 Further, the Court saw great
significance in Congress’s choice to enact an express preemption
provision for medical devices, but not for prescription drugs. 149 Thus,

145. Id. As one dissenting opinion noted, the Court’s majority opinion curiously omitted
any reference to the purpose presumption. Id. at 2483 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
146. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
147. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574 (2009).
148. Id.
149. Id.
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the absence of an express preemption provision can indicate
“Congress [did not think] state lawsuits posed an obstacle to its
objectives.” 150 The federal agency’s practices also favored preserving
state law, given that the FDA “traditionally regarded state law as a
complementary form of drug regulation. The FDA has limited
resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs on the market . . . .”151
Therefore, state laws could help shore up the FDA’s regulation of
drugs, presenting a promotion of rather than an obstacle to the
federal government’s goals.
As noted supra, the petitioners in Altria—cigarette
manufacturers fighting a state deceptive practices act claim arising
from their advertising their cigarettes as “light”—advanced an
implied preemption argument in addition to the express preemption
one. 152 The Court concluded that the state deceptive trade practices
statute was not impliedly preempted by virtue of “present[ing] an
obstacle to a longstanding policy of the FTC,” the federal agency
charged with administering the federal Labeling Act. 153 The Court
reviewed the agency’s guidance and consent orders and concluded
that no relevant longstanding policy existed. Thus, it appears that the
Court assesses claims of implied obstacle preemption skeptically,
perhaps reluctant to find preemption where Congress did not
include an express preemption provision and where the target of the
dual laws can in fact comply with both.
In summary, where a state wants to regulate an area that the
federal government has penetrated, it should evaluate the potential
for preemption by any existing federal provision in the regulated
area. If the area is one that the federal government has penetrated
pervasively, the state law may fall to field preemption. If a federal law
has express preemption language, the state law may nonetheless be
able to intercede in the gaps of the preemption provision, especially
in areas traditionally within states’ purview, given that the
preemption provision should receive a narrow construction.
Nonetheless, where the purpose behind the preemption provision
conflicts with the state’s regulation, the preemption provision may

150.
151.
152.
153.
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Id.
Id. at 578.
Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 87 (2008).
Id. at 89–90.
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well be construed to encompass, and therefore nullify, the state law.
Finally, state provisions that clear field and express preemption must
still overcome any implied preemption. In implied preemption
contests, however, states will benefit from the purpose presumption,
which favors preserving the state law.
The next question is what the preemption doctrine means in
relation to state efforts to restrict the information available in
consumers’ credit reports, specifically information related to adverse
credit history when evaluated for employment, criminal background
information, and medical information, as well as identity theft debris.
IV. SURMOUNTING THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT’S BARRIERS
Taken together, the Court’s recent preemption decisions
generally bode well for preserving state claims. First, field
preemption will not preclude states from intervening to protect
consumer financial information. Congress has quite clearly not taken
over this area, given that the Fair Credit Reporting Act—the premier
piece of federal legislation in this area—expressly evinces room for
state action. 154 Nonetheless, the FCRA presents express and implied
preemption challenges for states.
The Sections below provide a brief description of the FCRA and
an extended discussion of its various preemption provisions, along
with a summary of the case law construing those provisions.
Subsequently, the likelihood that the various types of state
reputation-protecting legislation identified supra would prevail
against a challenge of preemption—given the Supreme Court’s
decisions along with the role and provisions of the FCRA—
is discussed.
A. The FCRA
The FCRA provides the primary federal control over consumer
reports, and it conveys conflicting and complex messages about the
role of state law in regulating consumer credit reports. It creates a
federal regulatory scheme for consumer reports, yet explicitly
recognizes state law by providing a general rule that such laws are
preserved. Nonetheless, it claims a monopoly over certain fields

154. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(a) (2012); see infra text accompanying notes 159 to 161.
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within the territory of consumer report regulation, identifying
specific kinds of state laws that must yield to the federal Act. These
types of state laws vary by the degree to which they relate to their
corresponding federal provisions. After accounting for those
monopolized areas, however, the FCRA still leaves substantial room
for states to act, preserving a number of fields in which states can
enact legislation to accord more weight to their citizens’ privacy.
1. Overall scheme
The FCRA regulates “consumer reports,” also commonly known
as credit reports, although the definition clearly covers reports
describing matters other than mere credit. A “consumer report”
“means any written, oral, or other communication of any
information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a
consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity,
character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of
living” where that information is “used or expected to be used or
collected” for, among other purposes, “the consumer’s eligibility for
employment.” 155 A “consumer reporting agency” includes “any
person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit
basis, regularly engages . . . in the practice of assembling or
evaluating consumer credit information or other information on
consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third
parties . . . .” 156 Thus, this definition covers everything from the
standard big three consumer reporting agencies of Trans Union,
Experian, and Equifax to specialty agencies like tenant screening
agencies 157 and the medical information data aggregator MIB. 158

155. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (emphasis added). This article focuses on reports that
qualify as “consumer reports” under the FCRA. Legislation governing reports that do not fall
within this definition would face far fewer preemption concerns. See § 1681t.
156. § 1681a(f). The definition includes an interstate commerce nexus as well. Id.
157. For example, Tenant Background Search, which advertises that it can help a
landlord “[v]erify your applicant’s identity and credit, and search for a criminal background
before you rent. Tenant Background Search is the leader in providing high quality tenant
credit check and tenant background check services.” Order Now, TENANT BACKGROUND
SEARCH, https://www.tenantbackgroundsearch.com/tenantScreening.aspx (last visited Mar.
23, 2016).
158. See MIB.COM, http://www.mib.com/index.html (describing MIB’s services) (last
visited Mar. 23, 2016).
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Looked at broadly, the FCRA imposes responsibilities not just on
consumer reporting agencies, but also on the users who buy
consumer reports from agencies and the furnishers who feed
information about consumers to the agencies.
2. General rule of non-preemption
By its express language, the FCRA provides a general rule that
the Act does not preempt state law claims:
Except as provided in subsections (b) 159 and (c) 160 . . . , [the FCRA]
does not annul, alter, affect, or exempt any person subject to the
provisions of this [title] from complying with the laws of any State
with respect to the collection, distribution, or use of any
information on consumers or for the prevention or mitigation of
identity theft, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent
with any provision of this [title] . . . and then only to the extent of
the inconsistency. 161

This explicit acknowledgement of the states’ interest eliminates
Furthermore,
that
same
pervasive
field
preemption. 162
acknowledgement shows that the federal regulation does not have
the dominance that would lead to field preemption. 163 Accordingly,
159. Providing exceptions. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b). See infra text accompanying notes
166 to 176.
160. Defining the term “firm offer of credit or insurance” for purposes of both federal
and state law. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b).
161. § 1681t(a). This general preemption standard indicates that Congress did not
intend to comprehensively preempt states from the field of credit reporting regulation. See
Davenport v. Farmers Ins. Group, 378 F.3d 839, 842 (8th Cir. 2004); Credit Data of Ariz.,
Inc. v. Arizona, 602 F.2d 195, 197 (9th Cir. 1979).
162. See supra text accompanying note 74; see also Davenport, 378 F.3d at 842 (stating
that this provision demonstrates that Congress did not intend to preempt the field of claims
and upholding against a challenge of preemption a state insurance statute that regulated
behavior not covered by the FCRA); Credit Data of Ariz., 602 F.2d at 197 (upholding against
a challenge of preemption a state statute that required consumer reporting agencies to provide
free reports, a provision that predated the FCRA’s present free report provisions in 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681j(a)(1)); State Dep’t of Commerce, Community, & Econ. Dev., Div. of Ins. v.
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 165 P.3d 624, 626–27 (Alaska 2007) (upholding against a challenge
of preemption a state law that forbade insurers from failing to renew a personal insurance
policy “based in whole or in part on a consumer’s credit history or insurance score” without
the consumer’s consent). But see Consumer Data Indus. Ass’n v. King, 678 F.3d 898, 901
(10th Cir. 2012) (“The FCRA leaves no room for overlapping state regulations. Congress set
out to create uniform, national standards in the area of credit reporting . . . .”) (dicta).
163. See supra text accompanying note 75.
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the remainder of this Article will focus on express and
implied preemption.
The FCRA’s non-preemption language shows that Congress
presumed that the federal statute could coexist peacefully with a state
statute, even one that overlies the same territory, so long as the two
are not inconsistent. In this way the FCRA expressly incorporates a
version of the implied preemption doctrine to supplement the Act’s
express preemption provisions, discussed infra. A state law is
inconsistent with a federal law only if complying with one would put
the actor in violation of the other, 164 or if it would frustrate a
particular purpose of the federal act. 165
3. Specific express preemption provisions
The FCRA somewhat undercuts its general rule of nonpreemption by listing five sets of FCRA provisions that it protects
against any “requirement or prohibition [that] may be imposed
under the laws of any State.” 166 Three of these sets target fairly
narrow practices of the FCRA: (1) The exchange of information
among business affiliates; 167 (2) designated disclosures required by
the FCRA; 168 and (3) the frequency with which consumers can
obtain free consumer reports. 169
Along with those three narrow sets, however, the remaining two
sets cover a broad array of FCRA provisions. The two differ in the
164. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963).
165. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Equifax Servs., Inc. v. Cohen,
420 A.2d 189, 211 (Me. 1980) (testing the state provision against the “‘full purposes and
objectives’” of Congress).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b).
167. § 1681t(b)(2); see also Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Gould, 412 F.3d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir.
2005) (holding that this provision preempted that part of the California Financial Information
Privacy Act to the extent that it attempted to regulate the communication of information
among affiliates), appealed after remand, sub nom. Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Lockyer, 541 F.3d
1214 (9th Cir. 2008) cert. denied, 557 U.S. 935 (2009) (narrowing the state statute to sever
the preempted portion).
168. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(3). The FCRA specifically exempts from this prohibition
specified laws of the States of California, § 1681t(b)(3)(A), and Colorado. § 1681t(b)(3)(B).
In addition, the Act limits the effect of this prohibition on state laws regulating insurance
activity. § 1681t(b)(3)(C).
169. § 1681t(b)(4). The FCRA specifically exempts from this prohibition specified laws
of the States of Colorado, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Vermont
in effect on December 4, 2003. § 1681t(b)(4)(A)-(G).
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reach of the area around which the identified provisions remain
reserved for the federal monopoly. The first of these sets, which we
will call “subject matter preempters,” preempts state requirements or
prohibitions imposed as to the “subject matter regulated under”
eleven specific FCRA provisions. 170 The other group, which we will

170. § 1681t(b)(1)(A)–(I). These eleven provisions are as follows:
(A) subsection (c) or (e) of section 1681b of this title, relating to the prescreening
of consumer reports;
(B) section 1681i of this title, relating to the time by which a consumer reporting
agency must take any action, including the provision of notification to a consumer
or other person, in any procedure related to the disputed accuracy of information in
a consumer’s file, except that this subparagraph shall not apply to any State law in
effect on September 30, 1996;
(C) subsections (a) and (b) of section 1681m of this title, relating to the duties of a
person who takes any adverse action with respect to a consumer;
(D) section 1681m(d) of this title, relating to the duties of persons who use a
consumer report of a consumer in connection with any credit or insurance
transaction that is not initiated by the consumer and that consists of a firm offer of
credit or insurance;
(E) section 1681c of this title, relating to information contained in consumer
reports, except that this subparagraph shall not apply to any State law in effect on
September 30, 1996;
(F) section 1681s-2 of this title, relating to the responsibilities of persons who
furnish information to consumer reporting agencies, except that this paragraph shall
not apply—
(i) with respect to section 54A(a) of chapter 93 of the Massachusetts Annotated
Laws (as in effect on September 30, 1996); or
(ii) with respect to section 1785.25(a) of the California Civil Code (as in effect on
September 30, 1996);
(G) section 1681g(e) of this title, relating to information available to victims under
section 1681g(e) of this title;
(H) section 1681s-3 of this title, relating to the exchange and use of information to
make a solicitation for marketing purposes; or
(I) section 1681m(h) of this title, relating to the duties of users of consumer reports
to provide notice with respect to terms in certain credit transactions.
§ 1681t(b)(1); see Banga v. Equifax Info. Servs. LLC, No. 14-CV-03038-WHO, 2015 WL
3799546, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2014) (holding that a state credit reporting act’s
prescreening provision was preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(A)); Bauer v. Target Corp.,
2012 WL 4054296, 8:12-CV-978-T-AEP, 2012 WL 4054296, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 14,
2012) (holding that § 1681t(b)(1)(F) preempted a claim under a Florida state debt collection
statute’s provision that regulated furnishers’ disclosure of information about a debt); Galper v.
JPMorgan Chase, N.A., No. 13 CIV. 3449, 2014 WL 1089061, at *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17,
2014) (holding that both a conversion claim and a claim brought under a state statute that
restricted the transmission of information resulting from identity theft against a bank that had
allegedly made false reports to credit reporting agencies was preempted by section
1681t(b)(1)(F)); Dickman v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 2d 166, 175 (E.D.N.Y.
2012) (concluding that claims for breach of contract and for violation of a state deceptive
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call “conduct preempters,” has a narrower scope, eliminating only
those state requirements or prohibitions that pertain to the “conduct
required by” eleven additional FCRA provisions. 171 If we think of the

practices act based on a furnisher’s furnishing of false information to a credit reporting agency
was preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(F)); Okocha v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 700 F. Supp.
2d 369, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that a claim for violation of a state deceptive practices
act against an information furnisher for furnishing false information to a credit reporting
agency was preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(F)); Consumer Data Indus. Ass’n v. Swanson,
No. 07-CV-3376 PJSJJG, 2007 WL 2219389, at *4 (D. Minn. July 30, 2007) (holding that a
state statute prohibiting “mortgage trigger” lists was preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(A));
see also Premium Mortg. Corp. v. Equifax, Inc., 583 F.3d 103, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2009)
(holding that mortgage lenders’ claims for misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair
competition, and unjust enrichment brought against credit reporting agencies for their use of
mortgage “trigger leads” were preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(A)).
A recent Second Circuit opinion rejected a broad reading of these “subject matter”
preemption provisions. In Galper v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., the plaintiff, an identity theft
victim, sued the defendant, a bank whose employees had allegedly facilitated the identity theft.
802 F.3d at 442. The plaintiff brought a claim under a state identity theft statute, asserting a
theory of vicarious liability pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id. at 446. The
Second Circuit vacated the trial court’s dismissal of her claim, reasoning that section
1681t(b)(1)(F) preempts only those claims that concern a furnisher’s responsibilities, and not
all claims brought against an entity that also happens to be a furnisher. Id. The court rejected
the defendant’s argument that the preemption provision “preempts all claims ‘relating to the
responsibilities’ of furnishers in any way . . . regardless of the capacity in which the furnisher is
acting.” Id. at 447. Rather, the court reasoned that “Congress opted . . . to use language that
focuses more narrowly on the preemption of laws that regulate the responsibilities of persons
who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies.” Id. (emphasis in original).
171. § 1681t(b)(5)(A)–(I). This provision states as follows:
(b) General exceptions
No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State—
***
(5) with respect to the conduct required by the specific provisions of—
(A) section 1681c(g) of this title [pertains to truncation of credit card and debit
card numbers];
(B) section 1681c-1 of this title [pertains to identity theft prevention, fraud alerts,
and active duty alerts];
(C) section 1681c-2 of this title [pertains to the blocking of information resulting
from identity theft];
(D) section 1681g(a)(1)(A) of this title [pertains to the truncation of consumers’
social security numbers on their reports at their request];
(E) section 1681j(a) of this title [pertains to charges for reports made to consumers,
including the annual free report, and the time for reinvestigations of information on
such reports];
(F) subsections (e), (f), and (g) of section 1681m of this title [pertain, respectively,
to the requirement that agencies issue “red flag” guidelines and regulations; the
prohibition on the sale or transfer of debt caused by identity theft; and
communications required of debt collectors concerning identity theft];
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provisions given preemptive power as poles planted in the ground of
potential state regulation, those of the subject matter preempters will
cast a state-law-free shadow around them equivalent in scope to the
subject matter of that provision. In general, the conduct preempters
will cast almost no shadow at all—just wide enough to cover nearly
identical state provisions, or those that require identical conduct.
Finally, the FCRA blocks state law in one other instance—not by
preempting it, but by providing qualified immunity from certain
state torts to designated actors. 172 The immunity is not absolute; a
consumer can overcome it by showing that the defendant provided
false information with malice or with willful intent to injure the
consumer. 173 The provision plays a robust part in the analysis of
preemption of the common law claims it identifies, because its gears
must mesh with those of the preemption provisions in order to allow
all of the provisions to be effective. The rule against surplusage
encourages giving full meaning to every provision in an act, and
discourages interpretations that render a provision superfluous. 174
Accordingly, courts have had to struggle to harmonize the
preemption provisions with the qualified immunity provision in
order to ensure that they do not obviate the immunity—after all, no
one needs to be immunized from a preempted state law.

(G) section 1681s(f) of this title [pertains to required coordination among
consumer reporting agencies with respect to consumer complaint investigations];
(H) section 1681s-2(a)(6) of this title [pertains to the duties of furnishers upon
notice of identity theft-related information]; or
(I) section 1681w of this title [pertains to the required disposal of records].
172. This provision states as follows:
Except as provided in sections 1681n and 1681o of this title, no consumer may
bring any action or proceeding in the nature of defamation, invasion of privacy, or
negligence with respect to the reporting of information against any consumer
reporting agency, any user of information, or any person who furnishes information
to a consumer reporting agency, based on information disclosed pursuant to section
1681g, 1681h, or 1681m of this title, or based on information disclosed by a user
of a consumer report to or for a consumer against whom the user has taken adverse
action, based in whole or in part on the report except as to false information
furnished with malice or willful intent to injure such consumer.
§ 1681h(e).
173. Id.
174. This is known as the rule against surplusage. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174
(2001) (it is a “cardinal rule of statutory construction” that “a statute ought, upon the whole,
to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be
superfluous, void, or insignificant”) (internal citations omitted).
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However, the impact of the qualified immunity provision is
relatively irrelevant for the purpose of enacting reputation-protecting
state statutes. The question of the pool of laws subject to qualified
immunity has import for only those state causes of action that are “in
the nature of defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence.” 175 So
long as a state statute avoids presenting itself as a law of one of these
flavors, it will not be subject to qualified immunity. Therefore, no
further discussion of the qualified immunity provision of the FCRA
is necessary here.
In its preemption provisions, the FCRA focuses on state
“requirement[s] or prohibition[s]” that have a particular relationship
with a specified FCRA provision. 176 So, the question arises: How
would the Supreme Court define the breadth of such a relationship?
4. Significant areas clearly free from FCRA preemption
The FCRA identifies a slew of express preemption provisions that
require close analysis to determine the extent of areas of regulation
fenced off from the states. 177 Nonetheless, large patches of the Act’s
coverage are left bare for state intervention. The specific rules
regarding medical information, for instance, include restrictions on
identifying information reported by medical information furnishers178
and on creditor use of medical information. 179 In addition, most of
the Act’s provisions requiring consumer reporting agencies to put
accurate information in agency-issued consumer reports are free
from preemption language. This means that states themselves can
tighten accuracy standards, improving the protection of their
consumers’ reputations. 180 Similarly, states may enact requirements to

175. § 1681h(e).
176. § 1681t(b)(1)–(5). While the FCRA uses “relating to” in its preemption section, it
does so only to describe the content of the specific preempting provisions. It uses “with respect
to” to describe the relationship between the state law and the preempting subject matter.
§ 1681t(b)(5).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 166 to 171.
178. § 1681c(a)(6)(A); see § 1681a(i) (defining medical information).
179. § 1681b(g)(2); see also § 1681b(g)(1)(C) (requiring agencies to code medical
information so that the substance of the medical portion is hidden).
180. § 1681e(b) (requiring that “[w]henever a consumer reporting agency prepares a
consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of
the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates”).
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reinvestigate challenged data that would be more stringent than
those in the FCRA. 181 The FCRA also left its requirements for
obtaining a report for employment purposes free from preemptive
effect, leaving that area open to the states. 182
In addition, the FCRA has special requirements for reports that
contain detrimental public record information—information that
would include bankruptcy and criminal record information. 183 This
provision falls outside of FCRA preemption provisions, permitting
states to impose additional requirements for public record
information that agencies place in reports.
Finally, the FCRA’s remedies provisions are largely unaffected by
the FCRA’s preemption provisions. 184 States can therefore provide
additional protection to consumers by enhancing the remedies
available to those injured by the violation of a state provision, for
instance, by offering treble damages. Although a pair of Colorado
district courts have concluded that the FCRA’s willfulness damages
provision did preempt a Colorado statute’s treble damages
provision, 185 one court seemed to misunderstand both the FCRA’s
punitive
damages
provision
and
the
presumption
against preemption. 186

181. § 1681i.
182. § 1681b; 1681b(b).
183. § 1681k.
184. § 1681n (civil liability for willful non-compliance); 1681o (civil liability for
negligent non-compliance). A few FCRA provisions are expressly free from the act’s private
remedies provisions. See, e.g., § 1681s-s(a), (c)(1), g(e)(6).
185. Maiteki v. Knight Transp. Inc., 12-CV-2021-WJM-CBS, 2015 WL 328250, at *5
(D. Colo. Jan. 23, 2015); Eller v. Trans Union LLC, No. 09-CV-0040-WJM-KMT, 2012 WL
786283, at *3–4 (D. Colo. Mar. 9, 2012).
186. Eller, 2012 WL 786283 at *3. In assessing the FCRA’s provision for damages for
willfulness, the court noted only that the FCRA allows statutory damages, and failed to note
that the act also provides for punitive damages. See § 1681n(a)(1)(B)(2). Not only did the
court fail to note the general rule of non-preemption in section 1681t(a), it misread the
subsequent subsection as providing a list of FCRA provisions that were exempt from
preemption, when in fact it provides a list of subsections that are expressly given preemptive
effect. § 1681t(b); see supra text accompanying notes 166 to 171. Another Colorado district
court has permitted claims for punitive damages under both the FCRA and the Colorado
Consumer Credit Reporting Act, though without analyzing preemption. Eller v. Experian
Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 09–cv–00040–WJM–KMT, 2011 WL 3365955, at *18–19 (D.
Colo. May 17, 2011), magistrate’s report and recommendation adopted No. 09–cv–00040–
WJM–KMT, 2011 WL 3365513 (Aug. 4, 2011).
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Infra, the FCRA’s preemption provisions, viewed through the
prism of the Supreme Court’s recent express and implied preemption
decisions, are applied to four areas that are attractive candidates for
state regulation: employers’ use of credit reports and other kinds of
background checks, the inclusion of criminal record information, the
inclusion of medical debt information, and identity theft protections.
B. Strategies for States
The FCRA’s relationship to state law, along with its express
preemption provisions, allow a fair amount of room in which states
could operate to protect the reputations of their citizens, so long as
states craft those provisions carefully.
With respect to the regulation of consumer reports, no one
could credibly argue that consumer credit reporting is subject to
field preemption given the Act’s express statement that except as
otherwise provided, the Act does not “annul, affect, or exempt any
person subject to the [FCRA’s] provisions . . . .” 187 The preemption
analysis benefits from the purpose presumption, a precept the Court
has often stressed, in “that ‘the historic police powers of the States’
are not superseded ‘unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.’” 188 The Court has repeatedly emphasized this point. 189 By
expressly stating a general rule that the FCRA does not preempt state
law, Congress effectively nullified field preemption. Under the
remaining two preemption theories, a state statute that may tread on
an area in which Congress has toiled has to clear three analytical
hurdles: express preemption, and the two types of implied
preemption—implied impossibility preemption, and implied
obstacle preemption. 190
Taken together, the FCRA’s express preemption provisions
evince that Congress sought near exclusive control over the

187. § 1681t(a); see also supra text accompanying notes 159 to 165.
188. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
189. See, e.g., Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247,
2256 (2013); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009); Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S.
70, 77 (2008); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 78 to 153.
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regulation of information furnishers first, 191 followed by a somewhat
less vigorous interest in controlling consumer reporting agencies,
and even less interest in controlling users of consumer credit reports.
This indicates that the kind of state legislation most likely to survive
the preemption provision gauntlet is legislation targeted at the users
of specific information. Further, while some regulation of credit
agencies might be permitted, very little regulation of furnishers will
be tolerated. Infra, each area of recent concern is evaluated in light
of potential express and implied preemption challenges.
1. Employers’ use of credit reports
The FCRA contemplates that employers will use credit reports in
selecting and placing employees. It specifically designates
employment purposes as a permissible reason for looking at a
person’s credit history. 192 While the Act imposes slightly more
onerous terms on employers than those that apply to, for example,
run-of-the-mill creditors that use credit reports, 193 by and large it
permits employers as much access to an individual’s credit history as
any other entity that can claim a permissible purpose.
However, the express preemption doctrine would not block a
state law that prohibited employers from obtaining reports for
employment purposes. None of the FCRA’s express preemption
provisions cover the Act’s permissible purposes provision, which
permits an employer to acquire a credit report for employment
purposes. 194 Absolutely nothing in the FCRA itself requires an

191. A number of decisions have concluded that the preemption provision of §
1681t(b)(1)(F), which preempts a state “requirement or prohibition . . . with respect to any
subject matter regulated under— . . . section 1681s-2 of this title, relating to the
responsibilities of persons who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies” preempts
a state law claim arising from a furnisher’s furnishing of such information. See, e.g., Premium
Mortg. Corp. v. Equifax, Inc., 583 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 2009); Barberan v. Nationpoint,
706 F. Supp. 2d 408, 426–29 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Aleshire v. Harris, 586 Fed. App’x
668, 671 (7th Cir. 2013) (concluding that the plaintiff had forfeited her argument, but
reasoning that nonetheless the “argument is without merit because state law tort claims are
‘requirement[s]’ for preemption purposes”) (emphasis and citation omitted).
192. § 1681b(a)(3)(B).
193. The employer must notify the consumer that a consumer report may be obtained
for employment purposes and the consumer must authorize the employer’s procurement of a
consumer report. § 1681b(2)(A)(ii).
194. § 1681b.
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employer to obtain a credit report; accordingly an employer could
meet the demands of both the FCRA and a state law prohibiting
employers from accessing credit reports simply by abiding by the
state law. Thus, implied impossibility preemption would not arise.
As for implied obstacle preemption, recent Supreme Court
decisions indicate deference to state schemes, so long as the area is
not one in which Congress has pervasively regulated. 195 Given Wyeth
v. Levine’s heavy reliance on the purpose presumption, and the
FCRA’s own express reservation of power to states, any state law
limiting employers (or other users) from acquiring credit reports
would very likely clear implied obstacle analysis.
2. Criminal record information
State statutes that prohibit consumer reporting agencies from
including certain types of state record information on credit reports
are more vulnerable to express preemption. The state restrictions
described in Section II.A supra restrict specific users from asking for,
acquiring, or using credit information. An alternate method to
regulate the trafficking of personal information is to regulate the
content of a consumer report rather than its acquisition. In short,
not “user, you cannot buy this,” but “agency, you cannot sell this.”
This may appear to be an unnecessarily fine distinction, but the
FCRA’s express preemption provisions render this distinction
highly meaningful.
The FCRA has a content preemption provision that prevents
states from regulating the “subject matter . . . [of] section 1681c,”196
identified as “relating to information contained in consumer
reports.” 197 Criminal background information is content
information; furthermore it is content information that section
1681c specifically accounts for in part by effectively rendering arrest
records as obsolete, and thus ineligible for inclusion in a consumer
report, after seven years. 198 The question is whether a state law more
protective of such information than section 1681c—one that
prohibits consumer reporting agencies outright from placing
195.
196.
197.
198.
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criminal background information in consumer reports—would be
seen as relating to the subject matter of this section in light of the
Supreme Court decisions construing the effects of express
preemption provisions.
While the title of the section identified as preempted is broad—
“[r]equirements relating to information contained in consumer
reports” 199—the actual scope of the section is much narrower. It does
not purport to regulate content as a whole, but rather focuses on
specific items of information that should be excluded because the
information is old. This section addresses criminal record
information in three ways. First, it provides that consumer reporting
agencies may not, in general, report arrest records (or other adverse
criminal record information, 200 aside from convictions) that are more
than seven years old. 201 Second, agencies may nonetheless report
those records where a credit transaction or life insurance
underwriting is for $150,000 or more, or where the report is “to be
used in connection with . . . the employment of [someone who will
receive a salary] of $75,000 or more.” 202 Finally, agencies may report
all criminal convictions in perpetuity. 203 In analyzing the power of the
obsolescence provisions to preempt, one court concluded that the
FCRA’s obsolescence provision preempted a parallel Colorado
provision that prohibited criminal convictions that were more than
seven years old, reasoning that the state provision was clearly of the
same subject matter—the length of time an agency can report a
criminal conviction. 204 This analysis evinces a broad reading of the
section, one not necessarily justified by its content, as discussed next.
199. § 1681c.
200. § 1681(a)(5) prohibits the reporting of “[a]ny other adverse item of information,
other than records of convictions of crimes which antedates the report by more than seven
years.” Criminal record information qualifies as an “adverse item of information.” See, e.g.,
Haley v. TalentWise, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1192 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (information
regarding dismissed criminal charges qualified as “adverse” information).
201. § 1681c(a)(2), (5) (prohibiting agencies from reporting arrest records “more than
seven years” old or after “the governing statute of limitations has expired, whichever
is . . . longer”).
202. § 1681c(b)(1)–(3).
203. § 1681c(a)(5) (exempting criminal conviction records from the general rule that
agencies may not report “any . . . adverse item of information” “more than seven years” old).
204. See Simon v. DirecTV, Inc., 09–cv–00852–PAB–KLM, 2010 WL 1452853, at *4
(D. Colo. Mar. 19, 2010) (report and recommendation of magistrate judge), adopted by 09–
cv–00852–PAB–KLM, 2010 WL 1452854 (D. Colo. Apr. 12, 2010).
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However, the FCRA provision is less about the substantive
character of the information and much more about its age. The
provision establishes that information is sufficiently “fresh” only for
the designated period of time, without governing the content itself.
This construction casts the provision as closely resembling the
express preemption provision analyzed in Altria, where the Supreme
Court interpreted the preemption provision—“[n]o requirement or
prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under
State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the
provisions of this chapter” 205—as applying only to state laws based on
smoking and health. Reading the span of section 1681t(b)(1)(E) as
reaching only the subject matter of state laws that address the
obsolescence of criminal record information would mean that under
the reasoning of Altria, a broader statute, like the Maine deceptive
practices act involved in that case, would not be construed as
addressing the specific material that the preemption provision refers
to. The Court construed the state statute in Altria as imposing a
general duty not to deceive, rather than one that was more narrowly
based on “smoking and health.” Here, the FCRA’s content
preemption provision could apply only to state laws regulating the
time for which an item with specified content could remain on a
report, not the initial eligibility of the information to ever be
included in a report. Nonetheless, such an analysis would arguably
be an inapt adaptation of Altria, given that the state statute in that
case was a broadly applicable anti-fraud statute, in contrast to the
sort of content-specific state credit report statute that states might
consider limiting information placed in credit reports. Proponents of
a state ban on criminal record content might have to argue that
Altria should permit narrow state statutes where the coverage of the
federal statute’s express preemption provision was also
commensurately narrower.
What’s more, section 1681c relates specifically to what consumer
reporting agencies can put into a consumer report; every subsection
pertains to what an agency can and cannot do. 206 Nothing in the
section pertains to what an employer can or cannot do. Hence, one
205.
206.
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fair alternative to regulating the criminal record content of a
consumer report issued for employment purposes would be to tell
employers that they may not request a consumer report that includes
such criminal record information, or that if an employer receives a
report containing such information, the employer may not use it.
This approach regulates users, rather than furnishers or agencies, and
would create, in essence, an anti-discrimination law. This is the
approach taken by some states, including California and Illinois, in
recently enacted consumer report cloaking provisions that appear to
include reports of criminal history. 207 In this way the restriction
becomes a restriction on users of consumer reports, not creators of
consumer reports, and likely should fall outside the preemptive
effects of 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(E).
Under this—a constrained reading of the preemption provision
that would comport with the general rule that federal courts should
so read such provisions—a state would be permitted to prohibit
criminal records on credit reports, so long as it did not address the
length of time that other categories of information could be
reported by a consumer reporting agency. In contrast, a state statute
that sought to limit the window of time that a criminal record
(whether arrest, conviction, or other) could be reported would likely
be construed as intruding on the subject matter of the FCRA’s
obsolescence provision and thereby would be preempted.
3. Medical debt restrictions
Using similar reasoning, states should be able to pass
preemption-proof restrictions on the placement of medical debt
information in consumer reports. While states have not yet acted in
207. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a) (2011 & Supp. 2016); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT.
70/10(a). California’s provision broadly defines “consumer credit report” to include “any
written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer credit reporting
agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, or credit capacity, which is
used or is expected to be used, or collected in whole or in part for [designated permissible
purposes, including employment purposes.” CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a) (2011 & Supp.
2016) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.3(c) (2012)). Similarly, Illinois’s provision defines a
credit report to mean “any written or other communication of any information by a consumer
reporting agency that bears on a consumer’s creditworthiness, credit standing, credit capacity,
or credit history.” 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/5(a) (2008 & Supp. 2016). These two provisions
capture criminal record information to the extent it’s considered to impact creditworthiness.
See also supra text accompanying notes 41 to 52.
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this area, the fact that the 113th Congress considered a bill that
would have prohibited consumer reporting agencies from putting
designated medical debt in a credit report could inspire states to
do so. 208
Concerns over the privacy of medical information motivated
Congress to add protections to the FCRA when it revised the act in
1996. Congress limited the use of medical information by creditors,
insurers, and employers. 209 It defined medical information broadly,
encompassing “information or data . . . that relates to—(A) the past,
present, or future physical, mental, or behavioral health or condition
of an individual . . . .” 210 The FCRA’s restrictions on the use of such
information are more protective in the case of employment use than
in the case of an insurance transaction—for an insurance transaction,
the consumer need only consent to the furnishing of the medical
information. 211 However, for reports issued for employment or credit
transaction purposes, the agency may include the consumer’s medical
information in the report only if the information is relevant to the
transaction and the consumer has given “specific written consent
for . . . the report[.]” This consent must “describe[] in clear and
conspicuous language the use for which the information will
be furnished.” 212
Two of the FCRA’s express preemption provisions may impact
state regulation of medical debt information in consumer reports,
one relating to the content of reports and one relating to the
regulation of information furnishers. First, as discussed supra, the
FCRA has an express preemption provision that prevents states from
regulating the subject matter of section 1681c, relating to the

208. S. 160, The Medical Debt Responsibility Act of 2013 § 3, 113th Cong., 1st Sess.
(2013) (proposing an amendment to 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a), the obsolescence provision
described supra, that would delete from credit reports “[a]ny information related to a fully
paid or settled medical debt that had been characterized as delinquent, charged off, or in
collection which, from the date of payment or settlement, antedates the report by more than
45 days”).
209. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(g).
210. § 1681a(i).
211. § 1681b(g)(1)(A).
212. § 1681b(g)(1)(B). The act does permit agencies to include medical information
that “pertains solely to transactions, accounts, or balances relating to debts arising from the
receipt of medical services, products, or devises [sic]” where the information is coded to avoid
identifying the “nature of [the] services, products, or devices.” § 1681b(g)(1)(C).
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content of information contained in consumer reports. 213 However,
in contrast to its treatment of criminal record content information,
discussed supra, section 1681c says very little about medical
information content. The only reference to the medical industry
pertains to a report’s inclusion of the identifying information of any
medical information furnisher; the FCRA requires agencies to
withhold such information unless it is coded to avoid disclosing the
nature of the provider and what it has provided. 214
Accordingly, under the relatively state-friendly ruling of Altria, if
the preemption provision’s reference to the content of section 1681c
were read to size itself down to the very specific and limited content
restriction contained within section 1681c, then a broader state law
banning the inclusion of medical debt would appear to address
subject matter that differed from that in section 1681c, allowing a
state law ban to survive express preemption under this theory. The
main restrictions on the inclusion of medical information in
consumer reports are located not in section 1681c, which is the
target of an express preemption provision, but in section 1681b(g),
which is not such a target. 215 Accordingly, states should remain free
to decide what medical information content agencies may and may
not put in reports, so long as they do not put agencies in the
position of being unable to comply with both the state provision and

213. § 1681t(b)(1)(E); see supra text accompanying note 170.
214. § 1681c(a)(6). Specifically, the name, address, and telephone number of the
medical information furnisher are withheld. Id. This restriction does not apply if the agency is
providing the report to an insurance company for something “other than property [or]
casualty insurance”—meaning the agency can provided non-coded identifying information to
an insurance company that wants the report for medical, life, or other sorts of insurance. The
FCRA references medical information in a number of other ways. First, in general, information
that would otherwise be a consumer report is not such if it meets the terms of the Act’s
affiliate sharing exemption. § 1681a(d)(2)(A). However, that exception does not apply when
affiliates share medical information. § 1681a(d)(3). In addition, the FCRA imposes somewhat
stricter requirements on reports furnished for employment or credit purposes that contain
medical information, requiring that the information be relevant to the transaction and that the
consumer provide specific consent for the furnishing of the report. § 1681b(g)(B).
Nonetheless, information about medical debts may be included without those restrictions so
long as the information is coded to obscure the “specific provider . . . [and] the nature of . . .
[the medical] services, products, or devices” giving rise to the debt. § 1681b(g)(1)(C). So, as
long as the agency codes the information, it may place it in the report, including the amount
of the debt—that amount, of course, being precisely what will harm the consumer’s
credit rating.
215. Specifically, section 1681b(g)(1).
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the FCRA (which would lead to obstacle-impossibility
preemption) 216 or act so broadly as to disrupt the purpose of the
FCRA (which would lead to obstacle-purpose preemption). 217
Once such a state law has cleared preemption of the subject
matter of the FCRA’s content restriction provision, a state law
limiting medical debt information in consumer reports would then
have to hurdle section 1681t(b)(1)(F), an express preemption
provision prohibiting states from regulating the subject matter of the
FCRA’s main furnisher-responsibilities provision. However, even this
more specific subject matter preemption provision in the FCRA
should not impede states much. As discussed supra, this preemption
provision provides merely that states may not regulate the subject
matter of, among other provisions, a provision that requires
furnishers “whose primary business is providing medical services,
products, or devices” to notify the agency of their status as medical
information furnishers, a rather small, perfunctory provision. 218 Thus,
given a narrow construction, this preempting provision forbids states
from regulating the subject matter of notifications by medical
information furnishers to consumer reporting agencies. This
preempting provision is far narrower than that of the Medical Device
Amendment Act in Riegel, which preempted any state law beyond
one that was an identical twin to the federal law, leading the Court
to conclude that it barred state products liability claims. 219
California’s Supreme Court has in fact construed this preemption
provision narrowly, extending “only to state laws relating to
furnisher accuracy or dispute resolution.” 220 Accordingly, the
provision did not preempt a claim under a state medical privacy
statute. 221 Thus, a state provision barring medical debts from credit
reports that did not relate to furnisher accuracy or dispute resolution
should clear express preemption.

216. See supra text accompanying notes 134 to 145.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 147 to 153.
218. § 1681t(b)(1)(F) (incorporating § 1681s-2(a)(9)).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 105 to 111.
220. Brown v. Mortensen, 51 Cal. 4th 1052, 1064–65 (Cal. 2011) (rejecting argument
that the FCRA barred a claim under California’s Confidentiality of Medical Information Act
that arose from a dentist’s sharing of the medical records of a client and his sons, concluding
that the state act targeted different subject matter from that of section 1681s-2).
221. Id. at 1065.
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As for implied impossibility preemption, nothing would force an
agency to violate a state law forbidding the inclusion of medical debt
in credit reports in order to comply with the FCRA, because nothing
in the FCRA requires an agency to include medical debt in a
consumer report. Accordingly, that doctrine would not nullify a state
effort to keep medical debt out of consumers’ credit reports.
As for implied obstacle preemption, a medical debt restriction
would not be at direct odds with the FCRA’s purposes, one of which
is, ultimately, to protect consumers. 222 Thus a state provision limiting
the corrosive effects of involuntary expenditures for medical services
would be entirely consistent with that purpose. The FCRA’s proconsumer purpose contrasts distinctly with that of the federal motor
carrier services law construed in Rowe and its purpose to have market
forces, rather than state legislatures, impose limits. That purpose
conflicted with the youth-protecting purpose of the state antitobacco law, and thus the state law fell. 223 Therefore, a restriction on
medical debt would not become null under a theory of implied
obstacle preemption.
In short, states likely have a fair amount of room to exclude
medical debt from consumer credit reports, and could use that room
to help their citizens maintain the confidentiality of their
unanticipated or unaffordable medical expenses. Thus, states that are
concerned about the effects of medical debt on their citizens’ credit
reports could prohibit agencies from putting such debts into
credit reports.
4. Identity theft protections
States may be a good deal more hampered when it comes to
protecting their consumers from the crushing damage that can arise
when an identity thief has poisoned a consumer’s credit report with
the thief ’s own transactions. As described supra, New Mexico took
the step of enacting a provision making it reasonably easy for a
consumer to block information arising from an identity thief’s

222. See § 1681(a)(4) (stating that “[t]here is a need to insure [sic] that consumer
reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect
for the consumer’s right to privacy”).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 112 to 120.
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debts. 224 However, when Congress added identity theft–protections
to the FCRA, 225 it also boosted the preemption subsection to
specifically address those protections, staking out some exclusive
federal territory. The identity theft–related protections sheltered by
an express preemption provision include some duties imposed on
furnishers, 226 consumer reporting agencies, 227 the FTC and other
224. See supra text accompanying notes 65 to 68.
225. Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, Pub. L. 108-159, 117 Stat.
1952 (2003).
226. The following duties of furnishers relate to identity theft and are subject to a
preemption provision: Furnishers’ duties to “have in place reasonable procedures to respond to
any notification that it receives from a consumer reporting agency . . . relating to information
resulting from identity theft, to prevent that person from refurnishing such blocked
information.” § 1681s-2(a)(6)(A), subject to § 1681t(b)(1)(F) (subject matter).
Furnishers’ duties to refrain from furnishing information resulting from identity theft, where
the consumer has submitted an identity theft report to the furnisher. § 1681s-2(a)(6)(B),
subject to § 1681t(b)(1)(F) (subject matter). To trigger the furnisher’s duty, the consumer
must have submitted the report “at the address specified by [the furnisher] for receiving such
reports.” § 1681s-2(a)(6)(B). The furnisher may resume reporting the information if it
“subsequently knows or is informed by the consumer that the information is correct.” Id.
One court, however, has upheld a state identity theft provision against a preemption challenge
that asserted that the provision was within the “subject matter” regulated by section 1681s2(a)(6), concluding that the “state [action] . . . concern[ed] the direct relationship between
the credit provider and the consumer,” rather than one that fell within the “subject matter” of
a furnisher’s “reporting of credit information” to a consumer reporting agency. Pasternak v.
Trans Union, C07-04980MJJ, 2008 WL 928840, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2008).
227. The following duties of consumer reporting agencies are subject to a preemption
provision: Consumer reporting agencies’ duty to notify one who has requested a consumer
report that the address in the request “substantially differs from the addresses in the file of the
consumer.” § 1681c(h)(1). In theory the subject matter of this provision is subject to
preemption pursuant to § 1681t(b)(1)(E).
Agencies’ duties to provide fraud alerts, extended fraud alerts, and active duty alerts, and to
refer alerts to other nationwide consumer reporting agencies, and for resellers to reconvey
alerts, and to provide consumers with information on how to contact the Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection. § 1681c-1. The conduct required by this provision is subject to
preemption pursuant to § 1681t(b)(5)(B).
Agencies’ duties to block the reporting of identified theft-related information from a
consumer’s report, and to notify the information’s furnisher of the block. § 1681c-2. This
provision is subject to the conduct-required-by preemption provision of § 1681t(b)(5)(B).
This provision allows consumer reporting agencies to rescind or decline the block under the
following circumstances:
[T]he consumer reporting agency reasonably determines that—
(A) the information was blocked in error or a block was requested by the
consumer in error;
(B) the information was blocked, or a block was requested by the
consumer, on the basis of a material misrepresentation of fact by the
consumer relevant to the request to block; or
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federal agencies, 228 businesses that transact with identity thieves,229
owners of debts resulting from identity thieves, 230 and
debt collectors. 231
The relevant FCRA provisions generally regulate furnishers and
agencies. 232 Furnishers must refrain from furnishing to consumer
reporting agencies information they learn resulted from identity
theft; furthermore, furnishers must have procedures to respond to a
notice from a consumer reporting agency that the agency has
blocked such information. 233 Agencies, in turn, must provide fraud
alerts in reports and block identity theft-related information, among
other duties. 234

(C) the consumer obtained possession of goods, services, or money as a
result of the blocked transaction or transactions.
§ 1681c-2(c)(1).
The duty of nationwide consumer reporting agencies to develop procedures to refer identity
theft complaints, fraud requests, and information block requests to one another. § 1681s(f).
The conduct required by this subsection is subject to preemption pursuant to §
1681t(b)(5)(G).
228. The following duties of federal agencies are covered by an express preemption
provision: The Federal Trade Commission’s duty to prepare a summary of rights of identity
theft victims, and consumer reporting agency’s duties to provide consumers who complain of
being the victim of fraud or identity theft with the summary. § 1681g(d). States may not
impose any requirement or prohibition “with respect to the disclosures required to be made”
by this subsection. § 1681t(b)(3).
The duty of designated federal agencies to draft “red flag guidelines and regulations.” §
1681m(e). The conduct required by this subsection is subject to preemption pursuant to
section 1681t(b)(5)(F).
229. The duty of businesses who have transacted with an identity thief to provide to the
victim information about the transaction or transactions. § 1681g(e). The subject matter of
this subsection is subject to preemption pursuant to section 1681t(b)(1)(G). Furthermore,
states may not impose any requirement or prohibition “with respect to the disclosures required
to be made” by this subsection. § 1681t(b)(3).
230. The duty of owners of debts resulting from identity theft who have been properly
notified to not “sell, transfer, or place for [debt] collection [the] debt.” § 1681m(f). The
conduct required by this subsection is subject to preemption pursuant to section
1681t(b)(5)(F).
231. The duty of debt collectors who learn that the debts that they are attempting to
collect “may be fraudulent or . . . the result of identity theft” to notify the person on whose
behalf the collector is acting about these qualities of the information, and to provide certain
information to the consumer upon request. § 1681m(g). The conduct required by this
subsection is subject to preemption pursuant to section 1681t(b)(5)(F).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 226 to 227.
233. See supra text accompanying note 226.
234. See supra text accompanying note 227.
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In assessing the relationship between state identity theft
provisions and the FCRA, a California district court dismissed a
preemption challenge to a state identity theft provision that allowed
theft victims to sue creditors that seek to recover from the victim a
claim incurred by an identity thief in the victim’s name. 235 The
opinion narrowly construed the “subject matter” reach of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681s-2, one of the provisions identified in the FCRA’s subject
matter preemption provisions. 236 The court rejected the consumer
reporting agency’s arguments that two different provisions of section
1681s-2 that pertained to identity theft bore a subject matter that
extended to and nullified the state provision. 237 The court
characterized the plaintiff ’s action against the defendant—who
sought to force the plaintiff to pay the identity thief ’s debt—as one
that “concern[ed] the direct relationship between the credit provider
and the consumer,” rather than one that fell within the “subject
matter” of a furnisher’s reporting of credit information to a credit
reporting agency. 238 Thus, the court carefully analyzed the content of
the specific subsections of the FCRA’s furnisher obligations rather
than simply concluding that the preempting provision should be
construed as covering any state claim against a furnisher. 239
In contrast, some courts have construed the subject matter
preemption effect of the FCRA’s provision regulating furnishers as
broadly preempting any claim that relates to furnisher behavior,

235. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.92–.97 (2012). Identity theft victims can sue to establish
that they were the victims of identity theft and, thus, not responsible to a claimant for debts
incurred by the thief.
236. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F); Pasternak v. Trans Union, C07-04980 MJJ, 2008 WL
928840, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2008).
237. Pasternak, 2008 WL 928840, at *4. One FCRA provision pertains to the duties of
furnishers upon an agency’s notice of identity theft and imposing on furnishers a duty to
refrain from refurnishing the disputed information, § 1681s-2(a)(6), while the other requires
furnishers to take certain actions upon receiving an identity theft complaint from a consumer,
§ 1681s-2(a)(8).
238. Pasternak, 2008 WL 928840, at *4.
239. For similar careful, though less detailed analysis, see Lichtenfels v. Crook,
CV065007438S, 2007 WL 2938716, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2007) (dismissing
state law claims based on allegations of furnisher behavior that fell within section 1681s-2, but
retaining the others); Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Lichtenfels, CV044003402S, 2007
WL 2938730, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2007) (same).
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without carefully examining the precise contours of the different
responsibilities identified within that section. 240
A different federal court has also indicated that the FCRA’s
express preemption provisions may bar the New Mexico law that
overlaps with the FCRA’s identity theft debt-blocking provision. The
FCRA requires consumer reporting agencies to block the reporting
of identity theft debts that a consumer has properly identified as
arising from the work of an identity thief. 241 However, the FCRA
provision allows an agency to decline to block or rescind the barrier
to reporting debts resulting from identity theft if it “reasonably
determines that” one of three conditions was met—the information
was erroneously blocked, the consumer made a material
misrepresentation about the information blocked, or the consumer
benefitted from the blocked transaction. 242 New Mexico’s
240. See, e.g., Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 888 (9th Cir. 2010)
(holding that the FCRA preempted a state provision requiring furnishers who receive notice of
a dispute to investigate and review relevant information); Sukiasyan v. OCS Recovery Inc., CV
11-9622GAFCWX, 2013 WL 490683, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2013) (holding that a
California statutory provision regulating furnishers that provide negative credit information
was preempted); Harrold v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., C12-02987WHA, 2012 WL
4097708, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2012) (concluding that claims brought pursuant to CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1785.25(b), (c), and (f), which impose accuracy requirements on furnishers of
information to credit reporting agencies, were preempted by 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F));
Oganyan v. Square Two Fin., CV11-10226RGK VKB, 2012 WL 3656355, at *4 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 24, 2012) (holding that the section 1681t(b)(1)(F) preempted a California statutory
provision regulating furnishers that provide negative credit information, and also a provision
regarding furnishers’ reinvestigations, which the court characterized as “fall[ing] within the
general ambit” of section 1681s-2); Subhani v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, C1201857WHA, 2012 WL 1980416, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2012) (concluding that claims
brought against a furnisher under a state statute that imposed parallel requirements to those of
section 1681s-2(a)); Banga v. Allstate Ins. Co., CIVS081518LKKEFBPS, 2010 WL 1267841,
at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2010) (holding that the FCRA preempted a claim against a furnisher
brought under California’s unfair competition law to the extent that it was predicated on
violations of section 1681s-2(a) and (b)); Drew v. Equifax Info. Servs., C 07-00726 SI, 2007
WL 2028745, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2007) (holding that the FCRA preempted a claim
against a furnisher brought under a state statute with similarities to section 1681s-2, though
refusing to dismiss a state claim arising from a user’s conduct rather than a furnisher’s); see also
Wang v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 681 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (construing
California’s unfair competition law as imposing a “requirement or prohibition” by prohibiting
“‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice’”); Howard v. Blue Ridge Bank,
371 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1143–44 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (concluding that the 1681s-2 preemption
provision precluded a claim under California’s unfair competition law that sought to impose a
remedy for a violation of the FCRA’s provisions).
241. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2.
242. § 1681c-2(c)(1).
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overlapping provision appears to have the same general intent as the
FCRA’s blocking provision—that of protecting consumers from
being tarnished by debts that they did not create. However, the New
Mexico provision is more protective of identity theft victims, because
it does not permit consumer reporting agencies to evade their
responsibilities to block identity theft-related debt by engaging in
their own independent review of the block and, thereafter,
unilaterally rescinding it. 243 Rather, the New Mexico law permits an
agency to lift the block only if the consumer requests it or a court
orders it. 244
However, the FCRA expressly preempts state laws with respect
to the conduct required by the blocking provision. 245 Accordingly,
the main industry association for consumer credit reporting, the
Consumer Data Industry Association, sought to enjoin enforcement
of the New Mexico provision. 246 The district court dismissed the
complaint on the grounds that the CDIA could not establish
standing and therefore the case was nonjusticiable, but the Tenth
Circuit reversed, concluding that the declaratory relief the CDIA
sought would sufficiently redress its injury. 247 The court’s discussion
of the preemptive effects of the FCRA cause some concern. Rather
than addressing the quite narrow preemption provision that would
apply, the court stated grandly that “[t]he FCRA leaves no room for
overlapping state regulations.” As discussed infra, this substantially
misstates the text of the FCRA. 248
Two points oppose a broad reading of these identity theft-related
preemption provisions. First, these specific preemption provisions
should be construed in light of the introductory command of the
preemption section, that except as provided, the FCRA does not
“annul, alter, affect, or exempt any person . . . from complying with
the laws of any State . . . for the prevention or mitigation of identity
theft, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent [with the
Act], and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.”249 This
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
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N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-3A-3.1(D), (E) (2010).
§ 56-3A-3.1(E).
15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(5)(C).
Consumer Data Indus. Ass’n v. King, 678 F.3d 898, 902–03 (10th Cir. 2012).
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 249 to 252.
15 U.S.C. § 1681t(a) (emphasis added).
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countervailing instruction indicates that preemption should be
limited to only such state statutes that overlap nearly edge to edge
with one of the identified FCRA provisions.
Furthermore, as discussed supra, the Supreme Court has
deferred to state legislation that supports the purpose of the
corresponding federal law. As an additional argument against express
preemption of the New Mexico identity theft provision, both the
FCRA provisions and the New Mexico provision have the intent of
protecting consumers from debts that they did not create; they differ
in their details, not in their aim. Accordingly, the reasoning of Rowe,
where the pro-commerce aim of the federal statute differed from and
conflicted with the anti-tobacco aim of the state statute, can be
meaningfully distinguished. Furthermore, the aim of the New
Mexico identity theft provision—protecting consumers—is one that
has traditionally been the province of the states. 250
Nothing in the FCRA’s blocking provision requires a consumer
reporting agency to rescind a block based on its own determination
that the block was placed in error. Rather, the Act clearly states that
an agency “may decline to block, or may rescind any block” in the
identified circumstances. 251 Therefore, the absence of required
250. Admittedly, the state and federal regimes having the same aim might not immunize
the state provision from preemption. For instance, the Supreme Court concluded in Arizona v.
United States that some provisions of Arizona’s statute regulating unlawful aliens were
preempted by federal law. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502, 2505, 2507. However, there the state law
involved immigration, a subject over which “[t]he Government of the United States has broad,
undoubted power” and thus two state provisions that had immigration-management goals
similar to that of the federal regime were nonetheless preempted. The first, which made the
failure to comply with federal alien-registration requirements a state misdemeanor because
immigration bears the power of field preemption: “[T]he Federal Government has occupied
the field of alien registration.” Id. at 2502. Another provision, making it a misdemeanor for an
alien to seek work in the state, was preempted through implied obstacle preemption because
the means sought by the state law’s provisions (criminal enforcement) created an obstacle to
the aims of the federal regime, control through a civil mechanism. Id. at 2505. Similarly, a
third provision, which authorized state officials to arrest aliens without a warrant under
specified circumstances, interfered with the federal scheme by expanding the circumstances
under which state officers could act as immigration agents. Id. at 2506–07. A fourth provision,
however, survived preemption notwithstanding the federal law’s interest in maintaining control
over immigration because the Court concluded that it was premature to rule before the state
showed how it would interpret it. Id. at 2510.
However, in contrast to the area of consumer protection, this case involved an area that is
expressly reserved to the federal government in the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4
(granting the federal government power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization”).
251. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2(c)(1).
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conduct leaves nothing for section 1681t(b)(5)(C) to preempt
regarding the rescission of (as opposed to the placement of) a block.
Second, the preemption provisions extend only to the “conduct
required by” the identified FCRA provisions, in contrast to the
broader “subject matter regulated under” relationship that applies to
a clutch of other preempting provisions. 252
However, if the New Mexico law is ultimately found to be
preempted by the FCRA, New Mexico, along with other states,
could perhaps achieve its goal by painting with a broader brush. The
underlying problem with identity theft-related debt tainting a
consumer’s credit report is not the actual source of the debt, but the
fact of its inaccuracy. If a consumer reporting agency reported the
debt of another person as belonging to the targeted consumer, the
effects on the consumer would be just the same as if the misreported
debt did not arise from identity theft, but merely from the mixing up
by the agency of the targeted consumer with the debt’s true creator.
The issue is the accuracy of the information that the agency chooses
to assign to a consumer’s report. Accordingly, a state could mitigate
the effects of identity theft by imposing stricter accuracy
requirements on consumer reporting agencies, enhancing the
penalties for inaccurate reporting, or both. While the FCRA does, in
fact, impose certain accuracy requirements on agencies, 253 it imposes
nothing like strict attention to accuracy. Accordingly, by requiring
agencies to meaningfully assess the accuracy of information initially,
or to strictly verify it once it has been disputed by a consumer, a state
could quite likely drastically reduce the pernicious effects of identity
theft without stepping on the toes of the FCRA, which does not
explicitly preempt state laws imposing accuracy standards on
agencies, as opposed to furnishers. 254
Another fruitful way for states to thwart identity theft is through
mandating that consumer reporting agencies impose security freezes
on the files of consumers who request them. These permit a
consumer to hide their credit information from new potential

252. § 1681t(b)(1), (5).
253. §§ 1681e(b), 1681i.
254. See § 1681t(b)(1)(F), preempting states from regulating the subject matter of
section 1681s-2, which imposes accuracy requirements on furnishers.
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creditors 255 while allowing the consumer to explicitly “thaw” the
freeze for specific transactions. Several states have enacted such
provisions and they can effectively block an identity thief from coopting a consumer’s credit record. 256
States seeking to legislate in the identity theft area should avoid
implied impossibility preemption by ensuring that an agency, user, or
furnisher can comply with both the FCRA and the proposed state
law. Furthermore, states should proactively anticipate implied
obstacle preemption arguments. Wyeth indicated a preference for
consumer remedies, and some of the FCRA’s identity theft
provisions deny consumers a private cause of action for the violation
of identity theft specific provisions. For instance, the FCRA allows

255. In general, such freezes may not hide reports from existing creditors. See, e.g., 815
ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2MM(n) (providing that the freeze provisions do not apply to entities
that the consumer owes).
256. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 8-35-1 to -3 (2002 & Supp. 2015); ALASKA STAT. §§
45.48.100–.290 (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1698 (2013 & Supp. 2015); ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 4-112-101–14 (2011); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1785.11.2–.4, .6 (2012); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-14.3-106.6 to -106.9 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 36a-701–701a
(2011 & Supp. 2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 §§ 2201–04 (2013); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 283861 to -3864 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 501.005, 501.0051 (2010 & Supp. 2016); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-913 to -915 (2009 & Supp. 2015); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 489P-3 to
489P-6 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 28-52-101 to -109 (2013); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.
505/2MM (2008 & Supp. 2016); IND. CODE §§ 24-5-24-1 to -17 (2013 & Supp. 2015);
IOWA CODE §§ 714G.1–.11 (2013 & Supp. 2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-723 to -724
(2005 & Supp. 2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 367.363–367.365 (2008); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 9:3571.1(H)–(Z), 3571.3 (2009 & Supp. 2016); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §
1310 (2009 & 2015 Supp.); MD. CODE ANN., Com. Law §§ 14-1212.1 to -1212.3 (2010);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, §§ 56, 62A, 63, 64 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 445.2531–
.2535 (2014); MINN. STAT. § 13C.016–.019 (2013); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-24-201 to 217 (2009); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 407.1380–.1385 (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-1727
to -1736 (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 8-2601 to -2615 (2012); NEV. REV. STAT. §§
598C.300–598C.390 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-B:22 to -B:29 (2009); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 56:11-46 to -49 (2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-3A-2 to -6 (2010); N.Y. GEN. BUS.
LAW § 380-t (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-63 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 5133-01 to -14 (2007 & Supp. 2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.52 (2012); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 24, §§ 149–59 (2008); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646A.606–646A.618 (2015); 73 PA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2501–10 (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-48-1 to -9 (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 3720-160 to -161, -200 (2015 & Supp. 2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-15-1 to -16 (2004 &
Supp. 2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2108 to -2109 (2013); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE
§§ 20.031–.039, 20.21–.31 (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-45-201 to -205 (2013 & Supp.
2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2480h–j (2014); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-441.1 to -444.3
(2014); WASH. Rev. Code §§ 19.182.170–.210 (2013); W. Va. Code §§ 46A-6L-101 to -105
(2016); Wis. STAT. §§ 100.54–.545 (2010 & Supp. 2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-12-501 to
-509 (2015).
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consumers to obtain transaction information from businesses that
have been tricked by an identity thief into relying on the victim’s
identity. 257 However, the Act denies consumers a right to sue over a
violation of that provision. 258 Instead, only the Federal Trade
Commission and designated state officials may sue to enforce this
provision. 259 A state law that provided a remedy could complement
the FCRA, promoting the Congressional preference for allowing
consumers to have remedies that the Wyeth court noted. 260 Now,
quite possibly a defendant might argue that Congress’s explicit
carve-out of this section from the standard FCRA remedies
provisions 261 negated such a general preference in this specific
context. However, one response might be that, while Congress did
not intend to provide a federal remedy and have such litigation in
federal courts, nonetheless, Congress preferred that states determine
individually whether a remedy was appropriate and whether each
state wanted its courts to accommodate such claims, filling that gap
in the FCRA. Such a construction receives support from the antipreemption language of section 1681t(a) along with the fact that
consumer protection is typically the province of state law. 262
While the FCRA does preempt states from imposing any
“requirement or prohibition . . . with respect to any subject matter
regulated under . . . section 1681i of this title, relating to the time
by which a consumer reporting agency must take any action,”263 that
could fairly be read narrowly, pursuant to the principles described
supra, 264 to prevent a state from requiring an agency to complete a
reinvestigation of disputed information before the end of the 30 day
period that the section designates. 265 Even if it were construed to
read more broadly to extend to any reinvestigation of accuracy

257. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(e).
258. § 1681g(e)(6).
259. §§ 1681g(e)(6), 1681s.
260. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574 (2009).
261. §§ 1681n, 1681o.
262. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Abrams, 897 F.2d 34, 41–42 (2d Cir. 1990)
(“Because consumer protection law is a field traditionally regulated by the states, compelling
evidence of an intention to preempt is required in this area . . . .”).
263. § 1681t(b)(1).
264. See supra text accompanying notes 147 to 153.
265. § 1681i(a)(1)(A), (B).
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standards, states could still motivate consumer reporting agencies to
be more accurate (and thereby withhold identity theft-related data)
by imposing a stricter initial standard of accuracy, or by enhancing
the penalties available for inaccuracy, neither of which is covered by
the Act’s express preemption provision.
Nor should such provisions, or any of the other kinds of
legislative protections described supra, be preempted under either an
implied impossibility or implied obstacle preemption analysis.
Pursuant to PLIVA and Mutual Pharmaceutical, the standard for
impossibility preemption would require the regulated party to show
that it could not simultaneously comply with the federal and the
state standard. But none of the proposed courses of action would
impose that kind of conflict.
To succeed in an implied obstacle preemption analysis, a
regulated party would have to show that Congress’s purpose
sufficiently differed from that of the state that complying with the
state law would “stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” 266
However, keep in mind that the FCRA is, at its heart, a consumer
protection statute, not a consumer reporting agency industry
protection statute nor a furnisher or user protection statute. 267 Along
with the savings clause language, 268 the fact that consumer protection
is an area traditionally left to the states, 269 and the ample room that
the FCRA has left for states to regulate, the area differs significantly
from that of Rowe, where Congress sought to deregulate, rather than
regulate; to clear the table of restrictions on trucking whether they
be federal or state. Accordingly, states should take advantage of the
invitation implicit in the introduction to the FCRA’s preemption
section, which states that except as explicitly provided, the FCRA
does not “exempt any person . . . from complying with the laws of

266. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
267. See § 1681(a)(b) (“It is the purpose of this [act] to require that consumer reporting
agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit,
personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the
consumer.”) (emphasis added).
268. § 1681t(a).
269. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Abrams, 897 F.2d 34, 41–42 (2d Cir. 1990)
(“Because consumer protection law is a field traditionally regulated by the states, compelling
evidence of an intention to preempt is required in this area . . . .”).
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any State . . . for the prevention or mitigation of identity theft. . . .”
Rigorous accuracy requirements on consumer reporting agencies
would not only reduce identity theft but would benefit consumers
and the users that rely on consumer reports.
In sum, though the FCRA’s preemption provisions might appear
at first glance to present pervasive obstacles to state regulation of
reports about consumer’s financial information, in fact the Act leaves
lots of room for states to craft legislation that will protect consumers’
privacy and reputations without hindering legitimate commercial
uses for consumer reports.
V. CONCLUSION
The Great Recession may have revealed to us the extent of the
baggage that attaches to our identities, and the effect of that heft on
our opportunities to gain or advance in jobs, acquire credit, find a
place to live, or insure our belongings. Those revelations have
motivated many state legislatures to adjust the balance between the
legitimate interests of those who investigate consumers and the
privacy interests of consumers.
To be effective, though, state provisions must avoid preemption
by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. The breadth of those
provisions turns not just on their words, but the interpretation of
those words given the Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence.
Broad statutory enactments that impose general duties, such as state
deceptive practices act laws, may be less likely to fall victim to
preemption. Furthermore, states can strengthen the likelihood that
their measures will succeed by aligning the statutory purposes of
their legislation with that of the federal Act—ensuring the accuracy
of credit reports and promoting consumer protection. States will
benefit from the Supreme Court’s “purpose presumption,” which
prefers to avoid preempting legislation in those areas of states’
“historic police powers,” 270 one of which is consumer protection.
Given this backdrop, the types of provisions most likely to
succeed are those that focus on forbidding users of reports from
using a credit report for certain purposes, such as employment.

270.
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See supra text accompanying notes 131 to 134.

01.DEARMOND.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

365

8/11/2016 3:15 PM

Preventing Preemption

Limits on the content of consumer reports are more vulnerable
to preemption, but should survive so long as the FCRA’s content
preemption provisions receive a justifiably tight reading. Accordingly,
states should be able to restrict consumer reporting agencies from
placing specific criminal record information in credit reports.
However, state regulation of identity theft-related debt will likely fall
to the FCRA’s preemption provisions, which give the federal act
nearly a monopoly over such information. Nonetheless, states could
achieve the objectives sought by most identity theft credit report
provisions by regulating in an area that the FCRA does not protect
through its preemption provisions, such as by tightening overall
accuracy requirements imposed on consumer reporting agencies or
enhancing remedies available to injured consumers.
States should evaluate the legitimate needs of employers,
creditors, landlords, and ascertain the level of access to consumers’
information that will both fulfill those needs while cloaking those
aspects of their citizens’ lives that individuals prefer to keep private.
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